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I. Introduction
Taxation is one of the hottest legal topics today. When
President Donald J. Trump signed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
(TCJA)1 into law on December 22, 2017, it represented the most
sweeping tax reform in generations.2 In the area of tax law, no
issue is more important than the proper rate of corporate taxation
in the United States.3 The TCJA reduced the corporate tax rate
1. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
2. See Julia Horowitz, 34 Things You Need to Know About the Incoming Tax
Law,
CNNMONEY
(Dec.
26,
2017,
9:59
AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2017/12/20/news/economy/republican-tax-reformeverything-you-need-to-know/index.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2019) (“[The Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act] is the first significant reform of the U.S. tax code since 1986.”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jim Tankersley, Washington’s
Fight Over Taxes Is Only Beginning, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/23/business/washingtons-fight-over-taxes-isonly-beginning.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2019) (“An old Washington axiom is
that Congress passes a major tax overhaul once every 30 years. By that logic, the
sweeping 2017 tax law, which was raced through Congress by Republicans before
it was signed in late December by President Trump, was right on time.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Deirdre Walsh et al., White House,
GOP Celebrate Passing Sweeping Tax Bill, CNNPOLITICS (Dec. 20, 2017),
https://edition.cnn.com/2017/12/20/politics/house-senate-trumptaxbill/index.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2019) (“Republican lawmakers joined
President Donald Trump . . . to celebrate their largest legislative achievement of
2017, in a public ceremony spotlighting the most sweeping overhaul of the US tax
system in more than 30 years.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
3. See Shaun Terrill, Corrections and Substantive Fixes Needed with
Respect to Employee Benefit Changes Made by the 2017 Tax Act, BLOOMBERG BNA:
FED. TAX BLOG (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.bna.com/corrections-substantivefixes-b57982088882/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2019) (“On December 22, President
Trump signed into law . . . the first major overhaul of the U.S. tax system in 30
years.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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from 35% to 21%.4 While some business-related deductions and
credits were reduced or eliminated, the tax cut represents a major
windfall for corporate America.5 Some estimate that the savings to
corporations and cost to tax payers will be around $1 trillion.6 One
of the major reasons that politicians advanced for changing the law
was that the corporate tax rate was driving corporations to relocate
overseas and to engage in various tax avoidance strategies to
reduce their tax burdens.7 Whether the TCJA will reduce this
4. See Amanda Becker & David Morgan, What’s in the Final Republican
Tax Bill, REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-taxprovisions-factbox/whats-in-the-final-republican-tax-bill-idUSKBN1ED27K (last
visited Feb. 18, 2019) (reporting that the final version of the bill that was signed
into law as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act “[c]uts corporate income tax rate
permanently to 21 percent from 35 percent, as of Jan. 1, 2018”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Tara Golshan, 4 Winners and 4 Losers from
the
Republican
Tax
Bill,
VOX
(Dec.
22,
2017),
https://www.vox.com/2017/12/20/16790040/gop-tax-bill-winners (last visited Feb.
18, 2019) (“This bill permanently cuts the corporate tax rate from 35 percent to
21 percent to bring it closer to that of countries like Canada, which has a 15
percent corporate tax rate, or Ireland, which has a 12.5 percent rate.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Sabrina Siddiqui, Ben Jacobs &
Lauren Gambino, Senate Approves Most Drastic Changes to US Tax Code in 30
Years,
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
20,
2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2017/dec/19/donald-trump-tax-bill-plan-house-approves-senate (last visited
Feb. 18, 2019) (“The bill lowers the top individual tax rate from 39.6% to 37% and
slashes the corporate tax rate to 21%, a dramatic fall from its current rate of
35%.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
5. See David Harding, Michael Mankins & Karen Harris, What U.S. CEOs
Should Do with the Money from Corporate Tax Cuts, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 1,
2018),
https://hbr.org/2018/02/what-u-s-ceos-should-do-with-the-money-fromcorporate-tax-cuts (last visited Feb. 18, 2019) (“The new U.S. tax law is likely to
increase after-tax cash flows for U.S.-based companies by anywhere from 10% to
20%, depending on their current tax position. . . . The size of this windfall is
remarkable . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Brian
Peccarelli, Too Early to Call the Winners and Losers of Major Corporate Tax Cut,
HILL (Dec. 16, 2017), http://thehill.com/opinion/finance/365239-too-early-to-callthe-winners-and-losers-of-major-corporate-tax-cut (last visited Feb. 18, 2019)
(“[The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act] is . . . the one piece of the tax reform legislation
that the left and right agree would produce benefits for its intended audience: big
businesses.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
6. See Peccarelli, supra note 5 (“It’s hard to overemphasize the significance
of the Republican proposal to cut the corporate tax rate to 21 percent. At an
estimated cost of $1 trillion, it’s the headline and most expensive measure in the
entire tax reform package.”).
7. See Akane Otani, Richard Rubin & Theo Francis, Boom in Share
Buybacks Renews Question of Who Wins From Tax Cuts, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 1,
2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/boom-in-share-buybacks-renews-question-ofwho-wins-from-tax-cuts-1519900200 (last visited Feb. 18, 2019) (“The long-run
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problem remains unclear. With that said, it is unlikely that tax
avoidance can ever be completely eliminated.8
The permissibility of corporate tax avoidance is a central issue
in tax law. As of June 7, 2017, seventy-six countries and
jurisdictions signed or formally expressed their intention to sign
the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related
Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
(Convention), a multilateral agreement that is designed to reduce
corporate tax avoidance practices by multinational businesses by
closing gaps in existing international tax law.9 The Convention is
the product of the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
Project,10 which involves collaboration by the thirty-four members
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), all G20 members, and more than forty developing
countries.11 Notably, the United States is not a signatory.12
Although the Trump Administration has shown a recurrent
hostility to binding itself to international agreements, the United
States’ unwillingness to sign the Convention is surprising
economic case for the corporate tax cut was that the rate reduction and incentives
for business investment would give companies more reasons to invest in the U.S.,
because projects that didn’t make financial sense would become profitable.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
8. See David Gamage, How Should Governments Promote Distributive
Justice?: A Framework for Analyzing the Optimal Choice of Tax Instruments, 68
TAX L. REV. 1, 2 (2014) (“No one seriously suggests that tax avoidance and evasion
could be completely eliminated in real world contexts. Indeed, historical
experience with fundamental tax reform suggests that high-income taxpayers will
eventually find numerous ways to circumvent any plausible real world forms of
taxation.”).
9. See Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures
to
Prevent
BEPS,
ORG.
FOR
ECON.
CO-OPERATION
&
DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-convention-to-implement-taxtreaty-related-measures-to-prevent-beps.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2019)
(providing an overview of the agreement) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
10. See id. (explaining that the treaty “offers concrete solutions . . . by
transposing results from the OECD/G20 BEPS Project into bilateral tax treaties
worldwide”).
11. See id. (providing a list of signatories and parties to the agreement).
12. See id. (showing the absence of the United States from the list of
signatories or jurisdictions expressing their intent to sign).
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considering the seriousness of the issue. The OECD estimates that
tax avoidance practices by multinational firms may lead to up to
$240 billion of lost tax revenue globally, which is the equivalent of
10% of global corporate tax revenues.13 In the United States, the
Congressional Research Service estimates tax revenue losses of
$100 billion due to tax avoidance.14 A recent study suggests that
that 73% of Fortune 500 companies use tax havens.15 The study
notes, “American multinational companies collectively reported
forty-three percent of their foreign earnings in five small tax haven
countries: Bermuda, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and
Switzerland.”16 In short, the impact of tax avoidance is substantial,
important, and pressing.
Notably, tax avoidance should not be confused with tax
evasion. While tax evasion is the illegal nonpayment or
underpayment of taxes, corporate tax avoidance is the structuring
of business transactions to reduce a firm’s tax obligations in a
manner that technically complies with the law but violates the
spirit of the law.17 As a result, avoidance is distinguishable from
evasion by the legality of the action.18 For purposes of this Article,
corporate tax avoidance should also be differentiated from tax
minimization. Corporate tax minimization involves arranging a
firm’s affairs in a way envisioned by the legislative body to reduce
the firm’s tax burden.19 The Supreme Court of the United States
and other judicial bodies have regularly held that this type of
13. See OECD, POLICY BRIEF: TAXING MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, BASE
EROSION AND PROFITS SHIFTING (BEPS) 1 (Oct. 2015), http://www.oecd.org/policybriefs/PB-Base-Erosion-Profit-Shifting-(BEPS-III)-Oct-2015.pdf (discussing the
global impact of base erosion and profit shifting).
14. See JANE GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40623, TAX HAVENS:
INTERNATIONAL
TAX
AVOIDANCE
AND
EVASION
1
(2015),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40623.pdf (explaining the impact of corporate
profit shifting).
15. See RICHARD PHILLIPS ET AL., OFFSHORE SHELL GAMES 2016: THE USE OF
OFFSHORE TAX HAVENS BY FORTUNE 500 COMPANIES 1 (2016),
http://ctj.org/pdf/offshoreshellgames2016.pdf (explaining that at least 367 of
Fortune 500 companies “operate one or more subsidiaries in tax haven
countries”).
16. Id. at 2 (citing a 2008 Congressional Research Service Report).
17. See infra Part II.A (defining tax evasion).
18. See infra Part II.A (explaining the difference between tax avoidance and
tax evasion).
19. See infra Part II.A (discussing tax minimization).
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behavior is legally permissible.20 Because tax minimization
complies with both the letter and the spirit of the law, one would
have a hard time arguing that corporations should be blamed for
this behavior. If any entity should be faulted for tax minimization,
the legislative body establishing the tax regime should receive the
blame. Obviously, bright lines do not exist between tax evasion and
tax avoidance, and between tax avoidance and tax minimization.
These concepts often blur into each other.
While corporate tax evasion is prohibited because of the
illegality of the behavior, the question of whether corporate tax
avoidance is permissible is a much more difficult one. Some
corporate managers and tax advisors claim that aggressive tax
avoidance is mandated based upon the fiduciary duties owed
within the corporation.21 Explicitly or implicitly, they rely on the
holding in the seminal case, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,22 in which
the Supreme Court of Michigan held that “[a] business corporation
is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
20. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935) (“The legal right of a
taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or
altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted.”);
Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465 (1935)
(“Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he
is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not
even a patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes.”); see also Jerome B. Libin, Congress
Should Address Tax Avoidance Head-On: The Internal Revenue Code Needs a
GAAR, 30 VA. TAX REV. 339, 352 (2010) (“Tax minimization is part of our taxpayer
culture. Tax minimization within the boundaries of the law has been approved, if
not encouraged, by the Supreme Court.”); Allen D. Madison, The Legal
Framework for Tax Compliance, 70 TAX LAW. 497, 521–22 (2017) (“[T]axpayers
are entitled to make choices in their lives—taking into account the government’s
communications of its expectations for reporting—that minimize their taxes.”).
21. See Jasmine M. Fisher, Note, Fairer Shores: Tax Havens, Tax Avoidance,
and Corporate Social Responsibility, 94 B.U. L. REV. 337, 348–49 (2014) (“Some
corporate leaders and analysts perceive tax avoidance as unproblematic, pointing
to lawmakers’ failures to make such practices illegal as an indication of its
acceptability. . . . Corporate leaders may even view tax avoidance as obligatory;
as part of their fiduciary duties to shareholders.”); Alexander J. Morgenstern,
Note, Corporate Tax Avoidance: Addressing the Merits of Preventing
Multinational Corporations from Engaging in the Practice and Repatriating
Overseas Profits, 16 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 333, 334 (2017) (“Many corporate executives
justify corporate participation in tax avoidance as being ‘capitalistic’ or
encompassed in their fiduciary duties owed to shareholders.”).
22. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
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stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for
that end.”23 This holding can be derived from the fiduciary duties
that management owes to the corporation and its shareholders,
especially the duty of loyalty and the duty of good faith.24 As
discussed in my recent article with Professor Karie
Davis-Nozemack, Corporate Tax Avoidance and Honoring the
Fiduciary Duties Owed to the Corporation and Its Stockholders,
although the holding in Dodge remains true in general, the Dodge
mandate fails to require tax avoidance in any specific instance
because of the discretion that is granted to corporate managers
under the business judgment rule.25 As a result, a vacuum is
created regarding when engaging in tax avoidance is required,
permissible, or prohibited.26 One potentially can look to the fields
of corporate social responsibility, business ethics, and economics to
fill this vacuum,27 but the issue lingers whether corporate tax
avoidance is legally required, permissible, or prohibited.
This Article argues that aggressive corporate tax avoidance is
legally impermissible based upon the essential nature of the
corporate form. The history of the debate over the essential nature
of the corporation is substantial.28 This debate has been
reinvigorated by the Supreme Court’s recent opinions, Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission29 and Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc.,30 which explore the scope of corporate rights.31
23. Id. at 684.
24. See infra Part III.B (explaining how the Dodge mandate can be derived
from the fiduciary duties that corporate managers owe the corporation and its
stockholders).
25. See Eric C. Chaffee & Karie Davis-Nozemack, Corporate Tax Avoidance
and Honoring the Fiduciary Duties Owed to the Corporation and Its Stockholders,
58 B.C. L. REV. 1425, 1429–30 (2017) (discussing the scope of the Dodge mandate
that corporations be run primarily for profit).
26. See id. at 1470 (“[A]lthough the Dodge mandate remains true in general,
it provides little guidance in specific matters, including tax avoidance.”).
27. See id. at 1473–80 (discussing the role that the fields of corporate social
responsibility, business ethics, and economics can play in determining whether
corporations should engage in tax avoidance).
28. See infra Part IV (discussing the three prevailing theories of the
corporation that have developed over the past few centuries: artificial entity
theory, real entity theory, and aggregate theory).
29. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
30. 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
31. See generally, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the
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The debate has yielded three prevailing theories of the
corporation. First, the artificial entity theory, which is also
referred to as concession theory, suggests that corporations are
artificial entities that owe their existence completely to the
government.32 Second, the real entity theory, which is also referred
to as the natural entity theory, suggests that each corporation has
an existence and identity that is separate and apart from the
individuals who organize, operate, and own it.33 Third, the
aggregate theory, which is also known as the nexus of contracts
theory, suggests that a corporation is a collection of individuals
joined together through the intersection of various obligations.34
Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 999; Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Personhood
and the Corporate Persona, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 785; Margaret M. Blair &
Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673 (2015); Teneille R. Brown, In-corp-o-real: A
Psychological Critique of Corporate Personhood and Citizens United, 12 FLA. ST.
U. BUS. REV. 1 (2013); Ronald J. Colombo, The Corporation as a Tocquevillian
Association, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (2012); Reza Dibadj, (Mis)conceptions of the
Corporation, 29 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 731 (2013); Malcolm J. Harkins III, The Uneasy
Relationship of Hobby Lobby, Conestoga Wood, the Affordable Care Act, and the
Corporate Person: How a Historical Myth Continues to Bedevil the Legal System,
7 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 201 (2014); Virginia Harper Ho, Theories of
Corporate Groups: Corporate Identity Reconceived, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 879
(2012); Jason Iuliano, Do Corporations Have Religious Beliefs?, 90 IND. L.J. 47
(2015); Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Corporation as a “Real” Constitutional
Person, 11 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 221 (2011); Roger M. Michalski, Rights Come with
Responsibilities: Personal Jurisdiction in the Age of Corporate Personhood, 50 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 125 (2013); Joseph F. Morrissey, A Contractarian Critique of
Citizens United, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 765 (2013); Stefan J. Padfield, The Silent
Role of Corporate Theory in the Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance Cases, 15 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 831 (2013) [hereinafter Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate
Theory]; Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, 66 OKLA. L. REV.
327 (2014) [hereinafter Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory]; Martin
Petrin, Reconceptualizing the Theory of the Firm—From Nature to Function, 118
PENN. ST. L. REV. 1 (2013); Elizabeth Pollman, A Corporate Right to Privacy, 99
MINN. L. REV. 27 (2014); Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood,
2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629 [hereinafter Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate
Personhood]; Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporate First Amendment Rights After
Citizens United: An Analysis of the Popular Movement to End the Constitutional
Personhood of Corporations, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 209 (2011).
32. See infra Part IV.A (explaining the artificial entity theory of the
corporation).
33. See infra Part IV.B (explaining the real entity theory of the corporation).
34. See infra Part IV.C (explaining the aggregate theory of the corporation).
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While each of the prevailing essentialist theories of the
corporation is compelling because they describe some aspect of the
corporate form, each fails to provide a robust definition of what is
a corporation. The artificial entity theory, for instance, focuses on
the role of the government in creating the corporation, but it
largely ignores the role of the individuals organizing, operating,
and owning the corporation.35 The real entity theory focuses on the
corporation as a separate entity, but it largely ignores the role of
the government in creating the corporation and the individuals
organizing, operating, and owning the entity.36 In addition, the
aggregate theory focuses on the individuals organizing, operating,
and owning the corporation, but it largely ignores the role of the
government in creating the corporation and does little to explain
the corporation’s separate legal status.37 Moreover, all of the
prevailing theories concentrate on the question of how corporations
exist without answering why corporations exist. Because
determining the essential nature of a corporation is a definitional
inquiry, an essentialist theory that answers both questions is
needed.
In my recent work, I have developed an essentialist theory of
the corporation that I refer to as “collaboration theory.”38
Collaboration theory posits that the corporation is a collaboration
among the government and the individuals organizing, operating,
and owning the corporation. For purposes of my theory,
collaboration is defined as a common effort between or among
multiple entities to accomplish a task or a project. In regard to
for-profit corporations, the common project is economic
development and economic gain. This theory is superior to the
existing essentialist theories because it explains how corporations
35. See infra Part IV.A (explaining the artificial entity theory of the
corporation).
36. See infra Part IV.B (explaining the real entity theory of the corporation).
37. See infra Part IV.C (explaining the aggregate theory of the corporation).
38. See generally Eric C. Chaffee, Collaboration Theory: A Theory of the
Charitable Tax Exempt Nonprofit Corporation, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1719 (2016)
[hereinafter Chaffee, Collaboration Theory] (introducing and explaining
collaboration theory as an essentialist theory of the corporation); Eric C. Chaffee,
The Origins of Corporate Social Responsibility, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 353 (2017)
[hereinafter Chaffee, Corporate Social Responsibility] (applying collaboration
theory to the questions of why and when corporations should engage in socially
responsible behavior).

102

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 93 (2019)

exist (i.e. as a collaboration among the government and the
individuals organizing, operating, and owning the corporation),
and why corporations exist (i.e. for economic development and
economic gain). The goals of the government and the individuals
do vary a bit in the sense that the government is seeking social
economic development and gain, and the individuals organizing,
operating, and owning the corporation are seeking personal
economic development and gain. However, in most collaborations,
goals and interests do not perfectly align, and collaboration theory
offers a robust and compelling definition of what is a corporation.
This theory has generally been well received.39
By understanding the corporation as a collaboration between
the government and the individuals organizing, operating, and
owning the corporation, the impermissibility of aggressive
corporate tax avoidance becomes apparent. Collaborators in
business ventures owe each other a duty of good faith,40 and the
contractual nature of the corporation carries with it a duty of a
good faith as well.41 As a result, the notion becomes fanciful that
depriving the government of revenue through aggressive corporate
tax avoidance strategies is required or even permissible. Tax
avoidance is by definition violating the spirit of the law, and it is
an affront to the collaboration that forms the foundation of the
corporate form because it frustrates one of the government’s
purposes for entering the collaboration, i.e., gaining revenue.42
This Article advances the existing scholarship in three main
ways. First, this Article breaks new grounds by being the first piece
to examine how essentialist theories of the corporation should
inform the permissibility of corporate tax avoidance. Only after one
39. This work was featured on the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate
Governance and Financial Regulation. Eric C. Chaffee, The Origins of Corporate
Social Responsibility, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May
28, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/28/the-origins-of-corporatesocial-responsibility/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2019) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
40. See infra Part VI.A (discussing the duty of good faith that collaborators
in business ventures owe each other).
41. See infra note 263 (explaining the implied duty of good faith that
underlies all contractual relationships).
42. See infra Part II.A (providing a definition of tax avoidance).
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understands what a corporation is can one understand what
obligations a corporation has. Remarkably, no other article has
explored how essentialist theories of the corporation apply in the
corporate tax avoidance context. Second, this Article breaks new
ground because it explores how collaboration theory, a new theory
of the corporation that I developed, applies to corporate tax
avoidance. Third, this Article answers the question of whether
corporations are permitted or required to engage in aggressive tax
avoidance strategies. Once it becomes apparent that corporate
managers are not mandated by their fiduciary duties to engage in
aggressive tax avoidance, a vacuum is created regarding whether
corporate managers have any legal obligations regarding such
behavior.43 This Article argues that based upon the essential
nature of the corporate form as a collaboration, corporate
managers are legally required not to engage in aggressive tax
avoidance strategies because they violate the spirit of the law and
the duties of good faith that undergird the corporation.
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows. Part II
defines tax avoidance, explains why corporations engage in such
behavior, and why such behavior is wrong. Part III explores why
managers are not required to engage in corporate tax avoidance
based upon the fiduciary duties that they owe to the corporation
and its stockholders, which demonstrates that there is a lack of
understanding of when engaging in tax avoidance is required,
permissible, or prohibited. Part IV suggests that the essential
nature of the corporation is the place to begin in understanding
when tax avoidance is allowable and explores the prevailing
theories of the corporation, including artificial entity theory, real
entity, and aggregate theory. Part V discusses collaboration
theory, a theory that I have developed that better describes the
essential nature of the corporation. Part VI applies collaboration
theory to corporate tax avoidance and determines that corporate
tax avoidance should be avoided because it violates the duties the
individuals organizing, owning, and operating the corporation owe
to the government as collaborators in the corporate form. Part VII
provides brief concluding remarks.

43. See infra Part III.C (explaining that corporate managers have broad
discretion in how they go about seeking profit for the entity).
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II. Understanding Tax Avoidance

As a starting point, a few brief words ought to be offered about
the contours of tax avoidance. This Part explores the definition of
that term and its benefits and harms.
A. Defining Tax Avoidance
For purposes of this Article, tax avoidance is defined as
structuring business transactions to reduce a firm’s tax obligations
in a manner that technically complies with the law but violates the
spirit or underlying policies of the law.44 To put that definition in
the context of tax compliance behavior, one must understand what
I shall term the “spectrum of tax compliance behavior.”
At one end of the spectrum exists unreflective compliance in
which a taxpayer simply undertakes an activity without reflecting
on the tax implications. For example, many individuals purchase
homes, obtain educational loans, and undertake work activities
without prospectively considering how these activities might
impact the amount of taxes that they owe to the government.45
44. See Derek E. Anderson, Turning the Corporate Inversion Transaction
Right Side Up: Proposed Legislation in the 108th Congress Aims to Stamp Out
Any Economic Vitality of the Corporate Inversion Transaction, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L.
267, 286 n.71 (2004) (“[N]aked tax avoidance, as openly admitted by various
companies is clearly contrary to public policy and the spirit of the IRC.”); Assaf
Likhovski, ‘‘Training in Citizenship”: Tax Compliance and Modernity, 32 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 665, 691 (2007) (“Tax avoidance . . . is . . . the attempt to follow the
letter of the law ignoring the legislator’s intention (or the ‘spirit’ of the law) . . . .”);
Daniel T. Ostas & Axel Hilling, Global Tax Shelters, the Ethics of Interpretation,
and the Need for a Pragmatic Jurisprudence, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 745, 749 (2016)
(“Tax avoidance refers to not paying a tax or paying a reduced tax based on the
assertion of a literal interpretation of tax law that one knows was not intended
by the legislature, and if challenged, may not prevail in court.”).
45. See Kate Leifeld, Creating Access to Tax Benefits: How Pro Bono Tax
Professionals Can Help Low-Income Taxpayers Claim the Earned Income Tax
Credit, 62 ME. L. REV. 543, 556 (2010) (“Taxpayers often do not understand what
information the IRS needs or why their documentation is insufficient.”); Sagit
Leviner, The Role Tax Preparers Play in Taxpayer Compliance: An Empirical
Investigation with Policy Implications, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 1079, 1087 (2012) (“With
the growing complexity of the tax code, many taxpayers do not understand their
filing requirements and face significant difficulties completing tax forms by
themselves.”); Susan Striz, Note, The Key to Closing the Tax Gap: Understanding,
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Importantly, however, just because an individual or entity
undertakes a form of tax compliance behavior in one context does
not mean that they will undertake the same type of tax compliance
behavior in all contexts. To put it another way, the completely
oblivious tax payer is likely a rarity.
Next to unreflective compliance on the spectrum of tax
compliance behavior is tax minimization. This type of behavior
occurs when a taxpayer reflectively makes tax compliance
decisions with the goal of reducing that taxpayer’s tax burden
within the intended scope of the law; this type of behavior is
completely permissible.46 For example, this type of behavior might
occur in a situation in which a taxpayer opts to schedule two
surgeries that are not covered by insurance within the same tax
year to maximize the taxpayer’s health care deduction under § 213
of the Internal Revenue Code.47 It might also occur in a
circumstance in which a taxpayer chooses to do a large amount of
charitable giving in a single tax year to maximize their charitable
tax deduction under § 170.48
After tax minimization comes tax avoidance. As previously
mentioned, in the corporate context, tax avoidance is defined as
structuring business transactions to reduce a firm’s tax obligations
in a manner that technically complies with the law but violates the
spirit or underlying policies of the law.49 However, the concept can
obviously be extended more broadly than the corporate tax context.
It extends to any instance in which a taxpayer attempts to exploit
an unintended weakness in the tax code.50
112 W. VA. L. REV. 1053, 1077 (2010) (“Due to the complexity of the tax code, many
taxpayers make unintentional errors simply because they do not understand
what they are doing.”).
46. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (reporting that tax
minimization is legally acceptable).
47. See I.R.C. § 213(a) (2012) (“There shall be allowed as a deduction the
expenses paid during the taxable year, not compensated for by insurance or
otherwise, for medical care of the taxpayer, his spouse, or a dependent . . . to the
extent that such expenses exceed 10 percent of adjusted gross income.”). Notably,
the 10% was reduced to 7.5% for “any taxable year . . . beginning after December
31, 2016, and ending before January 1, 2019.” I.R.C. § 213(f) (2012).
48. See I.R.C. § 170 (2012) (“There shall be allowed as a deduction any
charitable contribution . . . payment of which is made within the taxable year.”).
49. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (providing a definition of tax
avoidance).
50. See Dora Arash, Crummey Trusts: An Exploitation of the Annual
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Finally, at the opposite end of the spectrum from unreflective
compliance is tax evasion. Tax evasion occurs when an individual
violates the tax law and includes any sort of behavior that violates
the law regardless of whether it is willful or not.51 Importantly, tax
avoidance, as used in this Article, in no way involves illegal
conduct.
B. The Benefits and Harms of Tax Avoidance
With the definition of tax avoidance explained, the issue now
becomes whether tax avoidance is a good or bad thing. As the
introduction to this Article reveals, tax avoidance is certainly
popular in corporate America.52 If tax avoidance is completely bad,
this reality would not exist. This subpart explores the benefits and
Exclusion, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 83, 84 (1993) (“The imposition of taxes generally
fosters an intense ambition on the part of those individuals adversely affected by
such taxes to seek means of avoidance. Tax practitioners . . . search for and
discover loopholes within the tax law that can be utilized for the purpose of tax
avoidance.”); Simone M. Haug, The United States Policy of Stringent
Anti-Treaty-Shopping Provisions: A Comparative Analysis, 29 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 191, 199 n.19 (1996) (“As opposed to tax evasion, which identifies
tax reduction by illegal means, tax avoidance is used to describe the reduction of
tax liability by legal means. Tax avoidance, however, has pejorative overtones,
especially in the context of artificial arrangements, loopholes, anomalies, or other
deficiencies of tax law.”); T. Modibo Ocran, Double Taxation Treaties and
Transnational Investment: A Comparative Study, 2 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 131, 138
(1989) (“Tax avoidance . . . occurs where the taxpayer takes advantage of
loopholes in the tax laws. . . . [T]ax avoidance does not technically infringe the
law, even though it may be equally damaging to the host state and can be morally
reprehensible.”).
51. See James Alm & Jay A. Soled, W(h)ither the Tax Gap?, 92 WASH. L. REV.
521, 524–25 (2017) (“[T]he phrase ‘tax evasion’ refers to illegal and intentional
actions taken by taxpayers to circumvent their legally due tax obligations by
underreporting incomes, overstating deductions, exemptions, or credits, failing to
file appropriate tax returns, and even engaging in barter.”); Kayal Munisami, The
Role of Corporate Social Responsibility in Solving the Great Corporate Tax Dodge,
17 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 55, 55–56 (2018) (“[T]ax evasion . . . is clearly and
uniformly illegal across jurisdictions . . . .”); Kyle Richard, Are All Tax Rulings
State Aid? Examining the European Commission's Recent State Aid Decisions, 18
HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1, 8 n.20 (2018) ("[T]ax evasion . . . involves the illegal
underpayment (or non-payment) of taxes by a taxpayer.”).
52. See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text (discussing the
widespread use of tax avoidance by large corporations).
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harms of tax avoidance, and explains the reasons why the harms
outweigh the benefits.
Tax avoidance has six major benefits. First, tax avoidance
benefits the corporation itself because if a corporation can lower its
tax burden through tax avoidance, then the financial performance
of the firm will improve.53 Second, if the financial performance of
the corporation improves through tax avoidance, corporate
managers are likely to be rewarded because of the improved
financial performance of the firm.54 Third, if the corporation is
doing well, stockholders will likely reap the benefit in the form of
increased value of their shares and dividends.55 Fourth, if the
corporation is doing well, creditors, employees, and other
stakeholders will also reap the benefit by having greater assurance
that debts will be repaid, and they will prosper.56 Fifth, if the
53. See Joshua D. Blank, The Timing of Tax Transparency, 90 S. CAL. L. REV.
449, 497 (2017) (“[A]s U.S. corporations can claim valuable tax losses and other
tax benefits that reduce their taxable income and tax liability without reducing
their earnings for financial accounting purposes, corporate tax directors often face
pressure, from shareholders and non-tax management, to pursue tax avoidance
strategies.”); Orly Sulami, Tax Abuse—Lessons from Abroad, 65 SMU L. REV. 551,
559 (2012) (“Taxpayers often . . . benefit on their financial statements from
abusive tax avoidance arrangements.”).
54. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporate Taxation and Corporate Social
Responsibility, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 24 (2014) (“If tax is considered a
cost . . . , it behooves the management to try to minimize this cost, or even turn it
into a profit. Thus, the goal of shareholder profit maximization can naturally lead
to corporations trying to minimize taxes and thus enhance earnings per share.”);
Noam Noked, Can Taxes Mitigate Corporate Governance Inefficiencies?, 9 WM. &
MARY BUS. L. REV. 221, 230 (2017) (“There is evidence which shows that a higher
level of incentive compensation is associated with an increased level of tax
avoidance, especially among firms with better corporate governance.”).
55. See Dennis F. Dunne, The Revlon Duties and the Sale of Companies in
Chapter 11, 52 BUS. LAW. 1333, 1345 (1997) (“In exchange for placing their capital
at risk, the stockholders will prosper if the company succeeds.”); Kent Greenfield,
Defending Stakeholder Governance, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1043, 1054 (2008)
(“[S]hareholders benefit only when the firm prospers.”); Robert C. Illig, The
Promise of Hedge Fund Governance: How Incentive Compensation Can Enhance
Institutional Investor Monitoring, 60 ALA. L. REV. 41, 49 (2008) (“[I]nstitutional
investors have a direct financial interest in the success of the corporations in
which they invest. As professional stockholders, institutional investors
presumably prosper when their investments appreciate and languish when they
disappoint.”).
56. See Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA.
L. REV. 789, 804–05 (2007) (“[W]hile shareholders may share in the wealth when
the corporation does well and suffer when the firm does poorly, so may employees,
creditors, and other stakeholders.”).

108

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 93 (2019)

corporation is performing well, society will benefit from increased
economic growth, especially because it is usually the largest
corporations that engage in tax avoidance.57 Sixth, if corporations
are doing well, the government will also likely benefit because the
electorate will be happy, assuming that tax avoidance leads to a
stronger national economy.58
The problem is that the harms of tax avoidance offset and
eclipse the benefits. Firms that undertake aggressive tax
avoidance strategies typically draw additional governmental
scrutiny as a result of their behavior,59 and they are increasingly
drawing scorn from the public.60 Tax avoidance deprives the
government of necessary funds to do its job properly,61 and it allows
57. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (reporting that 73% of Fortune
500 companies reduce their tax burden through the use of tax havens).
58. Cf. Christine Fauvelle-Aymar & Mary Stegmaier, Presidential
Popularity Rises and Falls with the Stock Market, LONDON SCH. OF ECON. U.S.
CTR. (Sept. 23, 2013) http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2013/09/23/presidentialpopularity-stock-market/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2019) (concluding that presidential
approval ratings are higher during times of economic growth) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
59. See Linda M. Beale, Tax Advice Before the Return: The Case for Raising
Standards and Denying Evidentiary Privileges, 25 VA. TAX REV. 583, 585–86
(2006) (“Recently, abusive tax shelters and customized tax planning have shone
a particularly unappealing light on lawyers who single-mindedly pursue their
clients’ tax-reduction goals . . . . The government’s answer to abusive tax
transactions has been greater transparency, tougher sanctions, and more
vigorous enforcement . . . .”).
60. See Allison Christians, Avoidance, Evasion, and Taxpayer Morality, 44
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 39, 41 (2014) (“[T]he ongoing media coverage of single-digit
effective tax rates paid on a global basis by household brand companies like GE,
Google, Apple, Starbucks, and Amazon, taught the public about an epidemic of
tax avoidance, often characterized as ‘aggressive’ to move it conceptually closer to
the concept of evasion.”); Sara Dillon, Tax Avoidance, Revenue Starvation and the
Age of the Multinational Corporation, 50 INT’L LAW. 275, 276 (2017) (“Tax
avoidance by large corporations is well-established, standard practice, and the
global public has waited in vain for effective steps to be taken to bring it to an
end.”); Tracy A. Kaye, The Offshore Shell Game: U.S. Corporate Tax Avoidance
Through Profit Shifting, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 185, 185 (2014) (“[P]ress coverage is
important because public perception matters to legislators on Capitol Hill and the
public is becoming increasingly aware of the corporate tax avoidance issue.”).
61. See Andrew Blair-Stanek, Intellectual Property Law Solutions to Tax
Avoidance, 62 UCLA L. REV. 2, 54 (2015) (“IP-based tax avoidance imposes
enormous economic harm: distorted worldwide investment decisions by
multinationals that lower economic output; massive tax revenue losses, with
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corporations to shirk paying their fair share of taxes, which angers
the public.62 Even if one views tax avoidance as an implicit tax
subsidy because governments sometimes tolerate or ignore it, tax
avoidance erodes confidence in the tax system and the democratic
process in general because tax avoidance is defined as structuring
business transactions to reduce a firm’s tax obligations in a
manner that technically complies with the law but violates the
spirit or underlying policies of the law.63 In sum, the harms of tax
avoidance outweigh its benefits because of the problems it creates.
III. Corporate Fiduciary Duties and the Requirement to Engage in
Tax Avoidance (or Lack Thereof)
While tax avoidance does have negative consequences, the
benefit to a corporation can be substantial. The issue then becomes
whether corporate managers are legally required, permitted, or
results like higher government deficits, lower spending, and higher taxes on
individuals; and the high transaction costs involved in implementing the
tax-avoidance strategies.”).
62. See Leo P. Martinez, Taxes, Morals, and Legitimacy, 1994 BYU L. REV.
521, 538 (“The selfishness of tax avoidance is promoted, even admired, despite the
fact that reduction of tax liability harms others.”); Julie Roin, Taxation Without
Coordination, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 61, 75 (2002) (“[Tax avoidance’s] sole real-world
effect is to decrease government revenues. Those who regard this effect to be
harmless fail to appreciate the fact that such lost revenue must be recouped,
generally by increasing taxes on other taxpayers or by moving to different taxing
mechanisms.”).
63. See William B. Barker, The Ideology of Tax Avoidance, 40 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 229, 229 (2009) (“Tax avoidance is recognized today by practically all
governments as a serious threat to the integrity of tax systems in democratic
societies.”); Kyle Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25
VA. TAX REV. 339, 352 (2005) (“[S]ome tax experts also worry that the highly
publicized spread of sophisticated tax avoidance on the part of corporate and
wealthy taxpayers undermines the average taxpayer’s respect for the system and
thus can lead to increased noncompliance at every level.”); Stephanie Hunter
McMahon, London Calling: Does the U.K.’s Experience with Individual Taxation
Clash with the U.S.’s Expectations?, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 159, 214 (2010) (“As
studies . . . have shown, the perception of widespread tax avoidance often reduces
the compliance of taxpayers who were not previously engaging in tax avoidance
because they begin to perceive the system as unfair.”); Zoë Prebble & John
Prebble, The Morality of Tax Avoidance, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 693, 726 (2010)
(“Both avoidance and evasion risk undermining public confidence in the tax
system. This can give rise to a vicious circle: as confidence falls, members of the
public become less likely voluntarily to comply with tax laws.”).
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prohibited to engage in tax avoidance. Many corporate managers
will argue that their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its
stockholders require them to engage in tax avoidance as a means
of achieving profit maximization.64 They either directly or
indirectly derive this requirement from the classic corporate law
case, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,65 in which the Supreme Court of
Michigan held that “a business corporation is organized and
carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers
of the directors are to be employed for that end.”66
Some commentators have argued that the Dodge mandate
should be rejected and ignored. For example, in Why We Should
Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, Professor Lynn A. Stout argues that
the Dodge mandate is outdated, is not from a leading court, and is
dicta.67 Moreover, she argues that the Dodge mandate is incorrect
because charters and articles of incorporation allow those
organizing the corporation to focus on more than seeking profit;
because most state codes allow corporate managers to focus on
more than mere wealth maximization in decision-making for the
firm; and because subsequent case law demonstrates a weakening
of the Dodge mandate.68 Finally, she argues that economic theory
also calls into question whether the Dodge mandate yields a
“well-functioning corporation.”69 She writes, “most contemporary
experts understand that economic theory alone does not permit us
to safely assume that corporations are run best when they are run
according to the principle of shareholder wealth maximization.”70
As a result, she asserts that the Dodge mandate cannot be justified
on normative grounds.71
64. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (explaining the view by some
corporate managers and tax experts that corporations must engage in aggressive
tax avoidance).
65. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
66. Id. at 684.
67. See Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA.
L. & BUS. REV. 163, 166–67 (2008) (discussing “why legal experts should hesitate
before placing much weight on Dodge v. Ford”).
68. See id. at 169–70.
69. Id. at 173.
70. Id. at 174.
71. Id.
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While Professor Stout’s article is thoughtfully written and
makes many valid points, the relationship of the mandate to tax
avoidance is still worth discussing, however, because of the
ubiquity of the Dodge mandate in classrooms, boardrooms, and
courtrooms. As analyzed in my recent article with Professor Karie
Davis-Nozemack, Corporate Tax Avoidance and Honoring the
Fiduciary Duties Owed to the Corporation and Its Stockholders,
while the Dodge mandate remains true in general because of the
fiduciary duties undergirding it, when coupled with the business
judgment rule, the Dodge mandate fails to require tax avoidance
in any specific instance because of the discretion that is granted to
corporate managers in undertaking their roles.72
A. The Dodge Mandate
To begin, a brief overview of the Dodge mandate ought to be
provided, including a summary of the case from which it derives.
In Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., the Supreme Court of Michigan held
that for-profit corporations must be run “primarily for the profit of
the stockholders.”73 In that case, the Ford Motor Co. became
tremendously profitable and was retaining a large amount of
money, rather than distributing it to shareholders as dividends.74
Henry Ford dominated and controlled the board, served as
president of the company, and owned 58% of the stock of the
corporation.75 He declared that the company would no longer issue
dividends to shareholders and that all future profits would be
reinvested in the corporation.76 Two reasons were cited by the
court for this new policy. First, in discussing this policy, Henry
Ford was quoted by the Detroit press and by news outlets
throughout the United States as declaring, “My ambition . . . is to
employ still more men; to spread the benefits of this industrial
system to the greatest possible number, to help them build up their
lives and their homes. To do this, we are putting the greatest share

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See generally Chaffee & Davis-Nozemack, supra note 25.
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
See id. at 670–71.
Id. at 671.
Id.
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of our profits back into the business.”77 Second, the retained profits
were also to be used to build an iron smelting plant to allow the
company to produce its own metal parts.78 As a result of the failure
to issue dividends and the new policies underlying them, John F.
Dodge and Horace E. Dodge, who were stockholders of the
company, brought suit.79 The lower court ruled in favor of the
plaintiffs and held that Ford’s actions were impermissible.80
The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed in part and reversed
in part.81 In regard to the humanitarian aspirations of the
company, the supreme court affirmed the lower court’s holding
that they are an impermissible ground for failing to issue
dividends.82 Writing for the majority, Chief Judge Russell C.
Ostrander stated, “A business corporation is organized and carried
on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the
directors are to be employed for that end.”83 Simply put, a for-profit
corporation must be run to make a profit.84 In regard to the
smelting plant, the supreme court reversed the lower court’s
holding. Chief Judge Ostrander wrote on behalf of the court,
“[J]udges are not business experts. It is recognized that plans must
often be made for a long future, for expected competition, for a
continuing as well as an immediately profitable venture.”85 As a
result, because a business purpose existed for the smelting plant,
the decision to build such a plant was squarely within the
discretion of the individuals running the corporation.86 In essence,
the court was applying the business judgment rule.87
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 668.
80. Id. at 677.
81. Id. at 684.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See id. (applying the business judgment rule in the decision).
87. Business-Judgment Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The
judicial presumption that in making business decisions not involving direct
self-interest or self-dealing, corporate directors act on an informed basis, in good
faith, and in the honest belief that their actions are in the corporation’s best
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Notably, despite the fact that the court in Dodge v. Ford Motor
Co. stated that for-profit corporations must be run “primarily for
the profit of the stockholders,” which suggests that other
considerations may be taken into account in making decisions for
the corporation,88 some have suggested that the opinion stands for
the stronger proposition that corporate management must engage
in wealth maximization, i.e., relentless profit seeking.89 As a result
of various limitations, which will be discussed later, the strong
version of the Dodge mandate that demands unrelenting wealth
maximization is likely not defensible.90 However, at minimum, a
robust focus on generating profit is required.
B. The Fiduciary Duties Management Owes to the Corporation
and Its Stockholders
Despite the recent criticism regarding the continued relevance
of Dodge v. Ford Co., the weaker version of the Dodge mandate,
i.e., that for-profit corporations must be run “primarily for the
profit of the stockholders,” does remain true.91 Even though the
Dodge mandate is outdated, is not from a leading court, and is
dicta,92 the weaker version of the Dodge mandate is derivable from
interest.”).
88. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
89. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 575 (2003) (“Dodge’s theory of
shareholder wealth maximization has been widely accepted by courts over an
extended period of time.”); Vincent S. J. Buccola, Beyond Insolvency, 62 U. KAN.
L. REV. 1, 24 (2013) (“The managerial ideal described in Dodge and similar cases
is that of shareholder-wealth maximization. Not every decided case is consistent
with the rule, of course, but it is a fair approximation to say that
shareholder-wealth maximization has been the traditional, direct aim of the duty
of loyalty.”); Keith William Diener, The Restricted Nature of the Profit Motive:
Perspectives from Law, Business, and Economics, 30 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 225, 237 (2016) (“The 1919 Michigan Supreme Court case of Dodge v.
Ford is often cited as the basis for a legal obligation to maximize shareholder
wealth.”).
90. See infra Part III.C (exploring various limitations placed upon the Dodge
mandate, including the business judgment rule, constituency statutes, and
drafting of bylaws and articles of incorporation).
91. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684.
92. See Stout, supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing Professor
Lynn A. Stout’s criticisms of teaching Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.).
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the fiduciary duties that corporate managers owe to the
corporation and its stockholders.
Although sometimes known by different names, the fiduciary
duties management by default owes to the corporation and its
stockholders are care, loyalty, good faith, and disclosure.93 The
duty of care requires corporate managers to reasonably inform
themselves of material facts prior to making decisions,94 and it
includes the obligation to engage in basic monitoring of the
business entity.95 It does not require that the decision that has
93. See S. Burcu Avci, Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, Ending
Executive Manipulations of Incentive Compensation, 42 J. CORP. L. 277, 314 (2016)
(“Although the Delaware courts have stated that there are no other fiduciary
duties outside of the recognized duties of care, loyalty, and perhaps good faith,
some applications of these duties may include the duty of candor or disclosure.”);
David L. Ponet & Ethan J. Leib, Fiduciary Law’s Lessons for Deliberative
Democracy, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1249, 1257 (2011) (“The fiduciary duties are routinely
described as a duty of loyalty and a duty of care—as well as duties of candor,
disclosure, and utmost good faith.”); Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Is
There an Emerging Fiduciary Duty to Consider Human Rights?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV.
75, 87 (2005) (“Corporate directors have a number of well-established fiduciary
duties under state corporate law: the duties of care, loyalty and full disclosure,
and the duty to act in good faith.”).
94. See Jorge E. Leal Garrett & Bryan A. Green, Considerations for
Professional Sports Teams Contemplating Going Public, 31 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 69,
85 (2010) (“[T]he duty of care imposes an obligation on the directors of the
corporation to inform themselves of material information prior to making any
decision.”); Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Sanitizing Interested Transactions, 36
DEL. J. CORP. L. 903, 908 (2011) (“The duty of care requires directors to be
adequately informed in making all corporate decisions.”); Gabriel Rauterberg &
Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty Waivers: An
Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075,
1084 (2017) (“The duty of care mandates that corporate fiduciaries exercise
informed business judgment in their stewardship of the company, imposing
liability if a fiduciary acts (or fails to act) without first being adequately
informed.”).
95. See Seth Davis, The False Promise of Fiduciary Government, 89 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1145, 1164 (2014) (“Directors . . . owe a duty of care, which requires
informed decisionmaking and some modicum of monitoring of the corporation’s
activities.”); Julie Andersen Hill & Douglas K. Moll, The Duty of Care of Bank
Directors and Officers, 68 ALA. L. REV. 965, 972 (2017) (“[D]irectors and officers
are obligated to use care in monitoring the activities of the principal employees
and the general affairs of the corporation as a whole.”); Lyman P.Q. Johnson &
Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 1149, 1198 (2004) (“Directors . . . may be liable for breach of the duty of
care if they fail to properly monitor and oversee the business affairs of a
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been made be correct or wise, and mere errors in judgment do not
constitute a breach of the duty of care.96 The duty is procedural in
nature,97 and a court will not look at the substance of the decision,
unless the decision constitutes corporate waste.98 Adherence to the
duty is judged by a gross negligence standard.99 Even so,
corporation.”).
96. See Leonard M. Baynes, Racial Stereotypes, Broadcast Corporations, and
the Business Judgment Rule, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 819, 856 (2003) (“Mere errors of
judgment and honest mistakes are insufficient as grounds for breach of the duty
of care. . . . Traditionally, courts generally do not want to interfere with the
corporate executives’ discretion.”); Robert J. Rhee, The Tort Foundation of Duty
of Care and Business Judgment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1139, 1197 (2013) (“[T]he
duty of care is a misnomer to the extent that it suggests liability for economic loss
caused by errors in judgment. Corporation law is correct to preclude substantive
review of good or bad risk taking . . . .”).
97. See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Investment Recommendations and the
Essence of Duty, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1265, 1323 (2011) (“In the context of corporate
law, the duty of care has been rendered largely a procedural rule, rather than a
substantive rule, in order to free directors to take calculated risks.”); Stephen
Ellis, Grant Hayden & Cynthia Rogers, A Game Changer for the Political
Economy of Economic Development Incentives, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 953, 976 (2014)
(“In the corporate setting, the board of directors is subject to a legal duty of care,
which imposes a procedural requirement that it asks the right sorts of questions
and considers the right sorts of information when making decisions.”); Charles R.
Korsmo, Lost in Translation: Law, Economics, and Subjective Standards of Care
in Negligence Law, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 285, 336–37 (2013) (“[C]ompliance with
the duty of care in corporate law—at least in Delaware—is largely evaluated in
procedural terms, i.e., did the board employ a thorough procedure?”).
98. See Carl T. Bogus, Excessive Executive Compensation and the Failure of
Corporate Democracy, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 77 (1993) (“[W]hen directors waste
corporate assets they violate their duty of substantive due care . . . .”); Brett H.
McDonnell, Committing to Doing Good and Doing Well: Fiduciary Duty in Benefit
Corporations, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 19, 43 (2014) (“The substantive side
of the duty of care is embodied in the . . . waste standard: managers may be held
liable for actions which are so irrational that they amount to giving away
corporate assets.”); William O. Fisher, To Thine Own CEO Be True: Tailoring
CEO Compensation to Individual Personality and Circumstances, 2017 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 599, 666 (2017) (“[D]uty of care prohibits extreme substantive
decisions that cannot conceivably benefit the corporation and effectively
constitute waste.”).
99. See Kathleen M. Boozang, Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine: When
is Falling Down on the Job a Crime?, 6 St. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 77, 93
(2012) (“The duty of care requires boards to engage ordinary care in the processes
by which they make decisions, and to supervise and monitor the activities of
corporate managers; however, liability results only when the fiduciaries’ behavior
constitutes gross negligence.”); Daniel S. Kleinberger, Delaware Dissolves the
Glue of Capitalism: Exonerating from Claims of Incompetence Those Who Manage
Other People’s Money, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 737, 745 (2012) (“Delaware law
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determining what constitutes reasonably informing oneself of
relevant information is far from a bright-line standard. As a result,
states have enacted statutes allowing corporations to include
provisions in their articles of incorporation eliminating liability for
breaches of the duty of care, if those organizing and owning the
corporation decide to do so.100
Next, the duty of loyalty requires that corporate managers not
engage in self-dealing.101 This means that corporate managers
has always been careful about imposing liability on corporate directors. Delaware
states its duty of care as the avoidance of ‘gross negligence’ and uses the business
judgment rule to reinforce the protections against personal liability for directors
of Delaware corporations.”); J. Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with
Profit: Governance, Enforcement, Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in
Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 33 (2011) (“Under
Delaware law, which often cues the market for corporate law, the directors’
conduct is measured against a gross negligence standard in duty of care cases.”).
100. See Janet E. Kerr, The Financial Meltdown of 2008 and the Government’s
Intervention: Much Needed Relief or Major Erosion of American Corporate Law?
The Continuing Story of Bank of America, Citigroup, and General Motors, 85 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 49, 83 (2011) (explaining that the Delaware General Corporation
Law “allows shareholders to adopt a clause in their corporation’s articles of
incorporation protecting directors from personal liability for monetary damages
for breaching the duty of care. Since Delaware enacted section 102(b)(7), all other
jurisdictions, with the exception of the District of Columbia, have enacted a
similar provision”); Geoffrey P. Miller, Pleading After Tellabs, 2009 WIS. L. REV.
507, 531 n.52 (“Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, and
its counterparts in other states, now allows companies to exempt directors from
liability for money damages for breaches of the duty of care, even if the conduct
involves gross negligence.”); Amy Deen Westbrook, Does the Buck Stop Here?
Board Responsibility for FCPA Compliance, 48 U. TOL. L. REV. 493, 506 (2017)
(“Director personal liability, however, has been limited by most states, Delaware
in particular, . . . [by corporate law statutes] providing that corporations may
include in their articles of incorporation clauses that exculpate directors from
monetary liability for conduct that is a breach of their duty of care.”).
101. See Jordan M. Barry & John William Hatfield, Pills & Partisans:
Understanding Takeover Defenses, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 638 (2012)
(“[C]orporate law imposes a duty of loyalty on corporate managers that prohibits
them from self-dealing to the detriment of the shareholders.”); John A. Pearce II,
The Rights of Shareholders in Authorizing Corporate Philanthropy, 60 VILL. L.
REV. 251, 270 (2015) (“The duty of loyalty requires directors to act on behalf of the
corporation and not engage in acts that constitute self-dealing or benefiting
improperly from their positions, to the detriment of shareholders.”); Russell C.
Silberglied, Litigating Fiduciary Duty Claims in Bankruptcy Court and Beyond:
Theory and Practical Considerations in an Evolving Environment, 10 J. BUS. &
TECH. L. 181, 185 (2015) (“The duty of loyalty prohibits a corporate director from
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cannot use their positions to advance their own interests at the
expense of the corporation and its stockholders.102 This requires
that managers put the interests of the corporations and
stockholders that they serve ahead of their own financial and other
personal pursuits.103 Moreover, the duty requires that managers
disclose and mitigate conflicts of interests with the corporations
and stockholders.104 It also limits their ability to engage in

engaging in self-dealing . . . .”).
102. See Iman Anabtawi, Predatory Management Buyouts, 49 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1285, 1290 (2015) (“Self-dealing offends the very essence of the fiduciary
duty of loyalty applicable to corporate managers. According to that duty,
managers must place the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders
ahead of their personal interests.”); Avci, Schipani & Seyhun, supra note 93, at
312 (“The duty of loyalty requires that corporate officers and directors act in the
best interest of the corporation and prioritize the interests of the corporation over
their own self-interests.”); Alina S. Ball, Social Enterprise Governance, 18 U. PA.
J. BUS. L. 919, 957 (2016) (“[T]he duty of loyalty . . . requires the director to place
the interest of the corporation above her own personal interest in a transaction or
decision.”).
103. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Managing Expectations: Does the Directors’ Duty to
Monitor Promise More Than It Can Deliver?, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 416, 419
(2012) (“The duty of loyalty seeks to ensure that in those situations, directors do
not place their own interests before the interests of the corporation and its
shareholders.”); Nizan Geslevich Packin, It’s (Not) All About the Money: Using
Behavioral Economics to Improve Regulation of Risk Management in Financial
Institutions, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 419, 444 (2013) (“[D]irectors owe a duty of loyalty
to prioritize the interests of the corporation and its shareholders over their own.”);
Amy Deen Westbrook, Does Banking Law Have Something to Teach Corporations
Law About Directors’ Duties?, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 397, 398 (2016) (“In fulfilling
their duty of loyalty, directors must not put their own interests, or even the
interests of others, ahead of those of the corporation.”).
104. See Virginia Harper Ho, Of Enterprise Principles and Corporate Groups:
Does Corporate Law Reach Human Rights?, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 113, 152
(2013) (“[T]he duty of loyalty requires the fiduciary to act in the best interests of
the corporation without self-dealing and to disclose the nature of any conflict of
interest or opportunity that may confer a financial benefit upon the fiduciary that
is unavailable to other shareholders or to the corporation.”); Phill Kline, Robert
T. Stephan & Reid F. Holbrook, Protecting Charitable Assets in Hospital
Conversions: An Important Role for the Attorney General, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 351, 360 (2004) (“The duty of loyalty requires corporate directors to disclose
actual and potential conflicts of interest in business transactions and act in the
best interests of the corporation.”); Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, Fiduciary
Constraints: Correlating Obligation with Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 697,
717 (2007) (“The duty of loyalty requires that corporate interests supersede
personal interests, and when conflicts of interest occur, they must either be
avoided or disclosed and approved by disinterested directors.”).
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transactions with the corporation and limits their ability to take
advantage of corporate opportunities.105
In addition, the duty of good faith requires that corporate
managers deal fairly and honestly with the corporation and its
stockholders.106 Some courts and commentators have conceived of
this duty as an independent fiduciary duty,107 while other courts
and commentators have conceived of it as a subsidiary duty to the
duty of loyalty.108 The duty of good faith is often coupled with other
105. See Norman D. Bishara & Cindy A. Schipani, A Corporate Governance
Perspective on the Franchisor-Franchisee Relationship, 19 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN.
303, 316 (2014) (“[T]he duty of loyalty is breached when directors divert corporate
opportunities, assets, or information away from the corporation for their own
personal gain.”); Ian David McClure, Accountability in the Patent Market: A Duty
to Monitor Patent Risk from the Boardroom, 31 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 217,
231 (2015) (“The duty of loyalty generally arises through a conflict of interest
created by a director that diverts corporate assets or usurps opportunities or
information from the corporation for personal gain.”); Peter Molk, How Do LLC
Owners Contract Around Default Statutory Protections?, 42 J. CORP. L. 503, 524–
25 (2017) (“In addition, to a general bar on self-dealing, the duty of loyalty has
expanded to include a prohibition on competing with the firm via one’s other
activities as well as a prohibition against claiming corporate opportunities for
oneself.”).
106. See Byron F. Egan, Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors and Officers
in Texas, 43 TEX. J. BUS. L. 45, 62–63 (2009) (“The duty of good faith requires that
directors act honestly, in the best interest of the corporation, and in a manner
that is not knowingly unlawful or contrary to public policy.”); Melvin A.
Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 5
(2006) (“The duty of good faith in corporate law is comprised of a general baseline
conception . . . of four elements: subjective honesty, or sincerity; nonviolation of
generally accepted standards of decency applicable to the conduct of business;
nonviolation of generally accepted basic corporate norms; and fidelity to office.”);
Janet E. Kerr, Developments in Corporate Governance: The Duty of Good Faith
and Its Impact on Director Conduct, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1037, 1051 (2006)
(“[D]irectors may be held personally liable for corporate misbehavior if their
conduct evidences improper motive or ill will, a reckless disregard of known risks,
a sustained failure to oversee management, or is so egregious that it is
unexplainable on any other grounds other than bad faith.”).
107. See Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 494
(2004) (“[G]ood faith is a separate duty from those of care and loyalty.”); Julian
Velasco, How Many Fiduciary Duties Are There in Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1231, 1271 (2010) (“[T]he Delaware General Corporation Law provides
support for the existence of an independent duty of good faith. Although it does
not explicitly create the duty of good faith, neither does it explicitly create a duty
of care or loyalty.”).
108. See Seth Davis, The False Promise of Fiduciary Government, 89 NOTRE
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fiduciary duties to express a court’s disdain for a particular breach,
and it is often used as a gap-filler when the other fiduciary duties
may not easily apply.109 This is especially true when the liability
for breaching the duty of care has been eliminated in the
corporation’s articles of incorporation.110 Because allowing
corporations to eliminate the duty of care by placing a provision in
their articles of incorporation is a relatively recent innovation in
corporate law, the duty of good faith is currently in a state of flux
and its coverage is evolving.111
Finally, the duty of disclosure requires that corporate
managers disclose information that is material to the operation of
the corporation.112 Some view this duty as a subsidiary duty to the
DAME L. REV. 1145, 1164–65 (2014) (“For a time, Delaware, the leading corporate
law jurisdiction, flirted with an independent duty of good faith, . . . . [b]ut in Stone
v. Ritter the court folded the duty of good faith into the duty of loyalty . . . .”);
Jonathan C. Lipson, Governance in the Breach: Controlling Creditor
Opportunism, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1035, 1074 (2011) (“Today, leading authorities
seem to view the debate as having come to rest at the latter point: good faith in
the corporate governance context is not a separate class of fiduciary duty, but
instead is a subspecies of the duty of loyalty.”); Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the
New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907, 1960 (2013) (“Part of
the fiduciary duty of loyalty is the duty to act in good faith.”).
109. See Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric
in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 6 (2005) (“[T]he emerging duty
of good faith is best understood as a rhetorical device rather than as a substantive
standard.”); Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral
Corporate Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673,
753–54 n.296 (2005) (“[B]ecause the duty of good faith is malleable, Delaware
judges have room to shape the duty of good faith, whereas judges have less
flexibility extending the duties of care and loyalty, the contours of which are more
fixed by an extensive body of caselaw and recognized corporate law principles.”).
110. See supra note 100 (explaining that many states have adopted statutes
allowing corporations to place provisions in their articles of incorporation
eliminating the duty of care).
111. See Regina F. Burch, Director Oversight and Monitoring: The Standard
of Care and the Standard of Liability Post-Enron, 6 WYO. L. REV. 481, 525 (2006)
(“The contours of the duty of good faith, as a fiduciary duty not subsumed within
the duty of loyalty or the duty of care, are still evolving.”).
112. See James A. Fanto, Braking the Merger Momentum: Reforming
Corporate Law Governing Mega-Mergers, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 249, 306–07 n.184
(2001) (“The duty of disclosure obligates directors to provide the stockholders with
accurate and complete information material to a transaction or other corporate
event that is being presented to them for action.”); Jack B. Jacobs, The Fiduciary
Duty of Disclosure After Dabit, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 391, 395 (2007) (“A classic,
although perhaps not complete, definition of the fiduciary duty of disclosure under
Delaware law is that corporate directors are required to disclose all material
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duties of care and loyalty,113 but others view it as a separate
fiduciary duty.114 Regardless, significant portions of this duty have
been codified within federal and state securities regulation.115 In
information within their control when they seek stockholder action.”); Jennifer
O’Hare, Director Communications and the Uneasy Relationship Between the
Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure and the Anti-Fraud Provisions of the Federal
Securities Laws, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 475, 492 (2002) (“The fiduciary duty of
disclosure requires directors of Delaware corporations to fully and fairly disclose
all material facts within their control when they make certain communications to
their shareholders. Put simply, if a director makes a material misrepresentation
to shareholders, he has potentially breached his fiduciary duty of disclosure.”).
113. See Kenneth R. Davis, Cash of the Titans: Arbitrating Challenges to
Executive Compensation, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 245, 250 (2014) (“Officers and directors
have fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and good faith to their corporation and its
shareholders, though courts often view the duty of good faith as a subset of the
duty of loyalty.”); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Social Value Orientation and the
Law, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 499 n.141 (2017) (“[T]he Delaware Supreme
Court has described the duty of good faith as a subsidiary element or condition of
the duty of loyalty.”); Mike Koehler, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Ripples, 3 AM.
U. BUS. L. REV. 391, 434 (2014) (“A director’s fiduciary duties include the duty of
care and the duty of loyalty, including its subsidiary component the duty of good
faith.”).
114. See David Rosenberg, Making Sense of Good Faith in Delaware
Corporate Fiduciary Law: A Contractarian Approach, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 513
(2004) (“Viewed as a device for interpreting contracts or other kinds of obligations,
the duty of good faith seems not to be a subsidiary or subset of loyalty as the
Delaware Court of Chancery would have made it. Rather, the duty to act in good
faith is broader . . . .”); Luke Scheuer, The “Legal” Marijuana Industry’s
Challenge for Business Entity Law, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 511, 538 (2015)
(“[M]anagers owe their businesses and investors a duty of good faith, which some
states include as a separate fiduciary duty and some include as a part of the duty
of care or loyalty.”); Julian Velasco, A Defense of the Corporate Law Duty of Care,
40 J. CORP. L. 647, 680–81 (2015) (“The duty of good faith has alternatively been
described as one of triads of fiduciary duty and as a subset of the duty of
loyalty . . . .”).
115. See Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives “Naked,
Homeless and Without Wheels”: Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and the
Debate Over Entity Versus Individual Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 631
(2007) (“Although fraud fits easily enough into the duty of candor category at state
law, most of the litigation about fraud takes place in federal court under the
federal securities laws.”); Geoffrey Rapp, On the Liability of Corporate Directors
to Holders of Securities for Illegal Corporate Acts: Can the Tension Between the
“Net-Loss” and “No-Duty-to-Disclose” Rules Be Resolved, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 101, 111 (2001) (“Under federal securities laws, corporate directors have
an affirmative duty of disclosure under certain circumstances.”); Kellye Y. Testy,
Linking Progressive Corporate Law with Progressive Social Movements, 76 TUL.
L. REV. 1227, 1235 (2002) (“[L]arge public corporations are already under
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regard to federal securities regulation, Justice Arthur Goldberg
famously wrote in the majority opinion for SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc.,116 “[a] fundamental purpose . . . [of federal
securities law] was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for
the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high
standard of business ethics in the securities industry.”117 The same
is true of state systems of securities law.118
The issue now becomes whether the Dodge mandate is
derivable from these fiduciary duties, which it is. For purposes of
deriving the Dodge mandate, among the fiduciary duties that
management owes to the corporation and its stockholders, the
most important is the duty of loyalty.119 The Dodge mandate
requires, “[a] business corporation is organized and carried on
primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the
directors are to be employed for that end.”120 The duty of loyalty
requires that corporate managers cannot use their positions to
advance their own interests at the expense of the interests of the
corporation and its stockholders.121 The interests of a for-profit
corporation, although they can be altered in the articles of
incorporation, are primarily to make a profit.122 The interests of
substantial duties of disclosure under the federal securities laws . . . .”).
116. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
117. Id. at 186.
118. See Therese H. Maynard, The Uniform Limited Offering Exemption: How
“Uniform” is “Uniform?”—An Evaluation and Critique of the ULOE, 36 EMORY
L.J. 357, 363 n.12 (1987) (“State Blue Sky statutes . . . generally insist on full
disclosure of all material facts as the basis for their local regulatory scheme. Many
states, however, . . . also apply the merit standard of review to examine the
fairness of the terms of a proposed offering.”).
119. See supra notes 101–105 (providing an overview of the duty of loyalty).
120. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
121. See supra notes 101–105 and accompanying text (explaining the contours
of the duty of loyalty).
122. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Corporate Religious Liberty, 30 CONST.
COMMENT. 277, 293 (2015) (“By definition, for-profit corporations exist to make
money; otherwise they would be non-profit.”); Carol Goforth, A Corporation Has
No Soul, and Doesn’t Go to Church: Relating the Doctrine of Piercing the Veil to
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 67 S.C. L. REV. 73, 78 (2015) (“The purpose of a for-profit
corporation is to run a business and make a profit . . . .”); Daniel J. Morrissey, The
Riddle of Shareholder Rights and Corporate Social Responsibility, 80 BROOK. L.
REV. 353, 353 (2015) (“Corporations exist primarily to make profit for their
shareholders. This has been the black letter rule of law and the reigning
orthodoxy of American business for a century.”); Christyne J. Vachon, Playing in
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the shareholders are more complex. Shareholders may buy the
stock of a corporation for a myriad of different reasons, including
wanting to make a profit; liking the corporation’s products; liking
the corporation’s services; liking the corporation’s politics; having
personal or professional relationships with the individuals
organizing, operating, or owning the corporation; or wanting for
some other reason to be affiliated with the firm.123 This raises the
following question: what interests of shareholders does the duty of
loyalty protect? To answer this question, one must remember that
the corporate form is contractual in nature.124 By purchasing stock
in a corporation, the shareholders are agreeing to be bound
together in a common entity that is designed to make a profit. 125
Although shareholders may buy stock for a myriad of different
reasons, the one that matters for purposes of determining the
the Sandbox: Moral Development and the Duty of Care in Collaborations Between
For-Profit and Nonprofit Corporate Persons, 33 PACE L. REV. 1045, 1067 (2013)
(“[T]he underlying constraint on the for-profit is that law restricts its goal as a
cooperative enterprise to . . . profit maximization for the benefit of the corporation
and its owners.”).
123. See Rugger Burke & Samuel P. Bragg, Sustainability in the Boardroom:
Reconsidering Fiduciary Duty Under Revlon in the Wake of Public Benefit
Corporation Legislation, 8 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 59, 71 (2014) (“[M]any shareholders
invest for reasons other than just the bottom line. For example, many investors
take a socially responsible approach by endorsing companies that share their
values or do not invest in industries that they find to be inherently negative.”);
Paul Rose, Common Agency and the Public Corporation, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1355,
1373 (2010) (“[S]ome shareholders invest with what may be characterized as
mixed motives—they are largely concerned with financial returns, but are also
likely, for various reasons, to support certain social causes.”).
124. See Michael M. Epstein & Nazgole Hashemi, Crowdfunding in
Wonderland: Issuer and Investor Risks in Non-Fraudulent Creative Arts
Campaigns Under the Jobs Act, 6 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 11 (2016) (“[T]he
Contractarian theory of corporate law . . . holds that the relationship between the
shareholders and managers of a public corporation is contractual in nature.”);
Benjamin D. Landry, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 889, 894 (2013) (“The courts
and the academic community have, for many years, broadly conceptualized the
relationship between the stockholders, the board of directors, and the corporation
as contractual in nature.”); Ann Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of
Arbitration Clauses in Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. 583, 589
(2016) (“There is a long history of courts referring to a corporation’s constitutive
documents as contractual in nature.”).
125. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of a
for-profit corporation).
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contours of the duty of loyalty owed by corporate managers is the
interest in making a profit because that is the agreement that they
made by investing in a for-profit corporation. This means that the
Dodge mandate is derivable from the duty of loyalty because the
duty of loyalty requires that managers must put aside their other
interests for purposes of seeking profit for the corporation and its
stockholders.126
The duties of care, good faith, and disclosure also support the
Dodge mandate.127 Because the duty of care requires managers to
reasonably inform themselves of material facts prior to making
decisions,128 and because for-profit corporations exist to make a
profit,129 corporate managers must reasonably inform themselves
of profit-making activities and cost-reducing opportunities.
Although the duty of care does not require that decisions be correct
or wise,130 it forces corporate managers to focus on profit-making
and profit-maximizing in performance of their duties, i.e., it forces
corporate managers to focus on the Dodge mandate.131
The relationship between the duty of good faith and the Dodge
mandate is more difficult to define for two reasons. First, the duty
of good faith is malleable, and its contours are difficult to define.132
Second, the duty of good faith is evolving in the wake of state
legislatures’ relatively recent decisions to allow corporations to
include provisions in their articles of incorporation eliminating the
duty of care, which has led to the duty of good faith regulating some
of the conduct that the duty of care used to be employed to

126. See supra notes 101–105, 122 and accompanying text (discussing the
duty of loyalty and the purpose of a for-profit corporation).
127. See supra notes 98–1040,1106–115, 1182–18 and accompanying text
(discussing the duties of care, good faith, and disclosure).
128. See supra notes 98–1040 and accompanying text (describing the duty of
care).
129. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text (reporting that the duty of
care does not require that corporate managers make an accurate or intelligent
decision).
131. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (stating
that corporations should be managed “primarily for the profit of the
stockholders”).
132. See supra notes 106–11 and accompanying text (describing the duty of
good faith).
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regulate.133 With that said, the duty of good faith requires that
corporate managers deal fairly and honestly with the corporation
and its stockholders.134 Because the relationship among the
corporation, its stockholders, and its managers exists for purposes
of making a profit,135 this suggests that the duty of good faith
requires that corporate managers adhere to the Dodge mandate as
a consequence of the agreement struck that beget the corporation
and allowed the investors to invest in it.
Lastly, the duty of disclosure also helps to support the Dodge
mandate as well. Although the duty does not directly require that
the corporation primarily seek profit, it does require that corporate
managers disclose information that is material to the operation of
the corporation, especially when mandated by state and federal
securities regulation.136 As a consequence, this creates
transparency in the operation of the corporation that makes it
more apparent whether managers are adhering to the Dodge
mandate.
C. Limitations upon the Dodge Mandate and the Lack of Clear
Guidance in Tax Avoidance Matters
While the Dodge mandate and the fiduciary duties from which
it derives might seem to require corporate managers to
unrelentingly attempt to maximize profit, various limitations on
the mandate give managers wide latitude in how they undertake
their functions.137 Notably, the mandate itself only requires that
“[a] business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for
133. See supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text (explaining that the duty
of good faith is evolving because many states allow corporations to draft articles
of incorporation in ways that eliminate the duty of care, which creates questions
as to whether the duty of good faith might cover some of the behavior that the
duty of care previously covered).
134. See supra notes 106–11 and accompanying text (describing the duty of
good faith).
135. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 112–18 and accompanying text (exploring the duty of
disclosure).
137. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).

COLLABORATION THEORY

125

the profit of the stockholders.”138 The word “primarily” suggests
that other interests may be considered.139 These other interests
could be included in the articles of incorporation or bylaws. Even if
they are not, many jurisdictions have adopted constituency
statutes that allow corporate managers to consider a much wider
range of interests of other constituencies—such as creditors,
employees, customers, and the general public—beyond the
interests of stockholders in making profits.140 In addition,
corporate managers can also seek stockholder approval or
ratification in the event that they are pursuing courses of action
that might be an affront to the Dodge mandate.141
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See ALA. CODE § 10A-2-11.03(c) (2017); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 10-830(D), 10-2702 (2017); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1202(c) (2017); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 7-106-105(7) (2017); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-756(g) (West 2018); FLA. STAT.
§ 607.0830(3) (2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5) (West 2018); IDAHO CODE
§ 30-1702 (2017); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.85 (2017); IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1(d)
(2017); IOWA CODE § 491.101B (2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210(4) (West
2018); ME. STAT. tit. 13-C § 831(6) (2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 65 (2017);
MINN. STAT. § 302A.251(5) (2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30(f) (2017); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 351.347(1) (West 2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-815(3) (2017); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 78.138(4) (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:12.02(c) (2017); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 14A:6-1(2) (West 2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D) (West 2018); N.Y.
BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney 2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-11-03(c) (2017);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(6) (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(F) (West
2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (2017); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715(a) (2017); 7
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-5.2-8(a) (West 2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-11-103(c)
(2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS. § 47-33-4 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-103-204
(2017); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.401 (West 2018); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 16-10a-840(5), 16-10a-1103(3) (West 2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 8.30(a)(3)
(2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-718(B) (2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.11.030(3)
(2017); WIS. STAT. § 180.0827 (2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830(g) (2017); see
also Burke & Bragg, supra note 123, at 68 n.34 (“Constituency statutes, also
known as stakeholder statutes, permit a board of directors to consider an
enumerated list of constituent (i.e., primary stakeholder) interests as well as
shareholder interests when making business decisions.”). But see William H.
Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations Are Redefining the
Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 830–31 (2012)
(“Conspicuously absent from the list of states adopting constituency statutes is
Delaware, where more than 900,000 business entities have their legal home,
including more than fifty percent of all U.S. publicly-traded companies and
sixty-three percent of the Fortune 500 companies.”).
141. See Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. CORP.
L. 239, 249 (2009) (“Activity that would otherwise constitute a breach of the duty
of loyalty can be cured or ratified by approval from a majority of disinterested
directors or a majority of disinterested shareholders.”); J. Travis Laster, The
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However, the most important limitation on the Dodge
mandate is the business judgment rule, which gives corporate
managers broad discretion in making business decisions.142 The
business judgment rule exists because courts do not wish to spend
their time second-guessing corporate managers.143 Judges
frequently have limited experience with making business
decisions, and managers know their corporations’ operations and
the environments in which they exist better than a court

Effect of Stockholder Approval on Enhanced Scrutiny, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1443, 1459 (2014) (“If the board makes a business decision on an issue within its
authority and submits the matter to the stockholders for a voluntary
vote, . . . then the resulting stockholder approval . . . causes the business
judgment rule to protect the board’s decision . . . .”); D. Theodore Rave, Politicians
as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 703 (2013) (“[C]orporate law provides two
primary safe harbor options for cleansing the taint of interested director
transactions: (1) approval by a majority of the disinterested directors or
(2) ratification through a fully informed vote by a majority of the disinterested
shareholders.”).
142. See Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 513, 581–82 (2015) (“[D]irectors have substantial freedom to make
decisions in the public interest. The business judgment rule means that courts
will refuse to second guess directors’ substantive business decisions, barring
conflicts of interest, corporate waste, or egregious procedural impropriety.”); Chad
J. Pomeroy, Well Enough Alone: Liability for Wrongful Foreclosure, 68 ALA. L.
REV. 943, 960 (2017) (“The business judgment rule is, essentially, a presumption
of correctitude reflecting the judiciary’s hesitance to second-guess the risk-taking
decisions of corporate officers and directors.”); Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side
Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2003, 2013 (2013) (“[T]he
business judgment rule gives boards legal discretion at any time to increase
employee salaries and benefits, treat suppliers more generously, retain earnings
to give creditors a larger ‘equity cushion,’ or decline to pursue aggressive
tax-avoidance strategies.”).
143. See Barry E. Adler & Marcel Kahan, The Technology of Creditor
Protection, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1773, 1782 (2013) (“[U]nder the business judgment
rule, a court will not second-guess a board judgment if the board was informed,
independent, disinterested, and acted in good faith.”); Justin Blount & Patricia
Nunley, Social Enterprise, Corporate Objectives, and the Corporate Governance
Narrative, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 201, 238 (2015) (“Through the business judgment rule,
officers and directors can direct the affairs of the corporation the best they are
able, without the fear that courts will second guess the difficult decisions they
must make.”); David G. Yosifon, The Social Relations of Consumption: Corporate
Law and the Meaning of Consumer Culture, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1309, 1342
(“Adhering to the “business judgment rule,” courts do not second-guess the
substance of business decisions that boards make.”).

COLLABORATION THEORY

127

adjudicating a matter.144 Often, business decisions are complex
and do not have a single correct answer, which makes determining
whether a decision was providently made difficult.145 In addition,
the business judgment rule allows corporate managers to pursue
more aggressive courses of action that help to fuel economic
growth.146
To take advantage of business judgment rule, all the manager
has to do is to articulate any business purpose for the decision.147
144. See Rachel J. Anderson, Reimagining Human Rights Law: Toward
Global Regulation of Transnational Corporations, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 183, 197
n.104 (2010) (“The business judgment rule is based on the presumption that
directors possess more expertise than judges when it comes to making business
decisions and so should not be second-guessed by judges as long as appropriate
procedures have been followed in the decision-making process.”); Lucian A.
Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
973, 996 (2002) (“Given courts’ limited information, expertise, and resources, the
business judgment rule rightly counsels courts against substantive review of the
merits of board decisions.”); Joseph Mead & Michael Pollack, Courts,
Constituencies, and the Enforcement of Fiduciary Duties in the Nonprofit Sector,
77 U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 304 (2016) (“The business judgment rule is also based on
the premise that directors have more expertise than courts and that investors
prefer business decisions in the board room instead of the courtroom.”).
145. See Davis, supra note 113, at 270 (“One rationale for the business
judgment rule is that judges may lack the expertise to evaluate complex business
decisions.”); Spencer Weber Waller, Corporate Governance and Competition
Policy, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 833, 855 (2011) (“The business judgment rule rests
largely on the presumption that directors (business professionals)—rather than
courts—boast the business acumen required to sufficiently assess the economic
risk associated with their often complex decisions.”).
146. See Aaron Brumbaugh, The Business Judgement Rule and the
Diversified Investor: Encouraging Risk in Financial Institutions, 17 U.C. DAVIS
BUS. L.J. 171, 174 (2017) (“The Business Judgment Rule offers decision makers a
safeguard from liability associated with the possible poor outcomes of those risky
decisions, which . . . encourages the decision makers to be less averse to
risk . . . and aim for the returns that diversified shareholders want.”); Alex
Devience, Jr., A Hindsight Review of the Business Judgment Rule in a Takeover
Environment: The State of the Business Judgment Rule After the Fall, 5 DEPAUL
BUS. L.J. 113, 135 (1992) (“The business judgment rule is a judicial principle that
attempts to balance a corporation’s need for honest governance with its need for
aggressive managers who may make imprudent judgments in the general
management scheme.”); David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 181, 223 n.155 (2013) (“The business judgment rule helps
support . . . risk-preferring strategy in individual companies, as it absolves
corporate boards from fear that aggressive, unorthodox decision-making will be
second-guessed if it goes wrong.”).
147. See Blount & Nunley, supra note 143, at 306 (“[T]he business judgment
rule . . . insulates directors and officers from liability in carrying on the business
of the organization as long as their decisions are made in good faith and
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In Dodge v. Ford, for example, the Supreme Court of Michigan held
that the Ford Motor Company’s retention of profits to build an iron
smelting plant to allow the company to produce its own metal parts
was acceptable because of the business judgment rule.148
In tax strategy matters, courts have given corporate managers
the benefit of the business judgment presumption to defeat claims
of breach of fiduciary duty. Kamin v. American Express Co.149 offers
one classic example of a court issuing such a holding.150 In that
case, two minority stockholders of American Express Company
brought a derivative suit against the directors of the corporation
based upon the board’s decision to issue a special dividend, rather
than pursuing a course of action that would have a tax benefit.151
In 1972, American Express had acquired 1,954,418 shares of
Donaldson, Lufken and Jenrette, Inc. (DLJ) for investment at a
cost of $29.9 million.152 The market value of company at the time
of the court’s opinion had declined to $4 million.153 On July 28,
1975, the board declared that the stockholders of American
Express would receive the DLJ shares as a special dividend.154 The
plaintiffs contended that American Express should have sold the

attributable to a rational business purpose.”); Julie Andersen Hill & Douglas K.
Moll, The Duty of Care of Bank Directors and Officers, 68 ALA. L. REV. 965, 978
(2017) (“The business judgment rule is an especially deferential standard of
review that insulates directors and officers from liability for a poor decision so
long as the decision can be attributed to a rational business purpose.”);
Westbrook, supra note 103, at 399 (“[C]ourts refrain from second-guessing board
decisions after the fact unless it is shown that the decision was uninformed, did
not serve a rational business purpose, was made by directors with a personal
interest in the decision, or was made by directors who were not
independent . . . .”).
148. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“[J]udges
are not business experts. It is recognized that plans must often be made for a long
future, for expected competition, for a continuing as well as an immediately
profitable venture.”).
149. 86 Misc.2d 809 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
150. Id. at 813.
151. Id. at 810.
152. Id. at 811.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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shares at a capital loss of $25 million to offset capital gains on other
investments.155
The Supreme Court of New York held that the directors’
decision was protected by the business judgment presumption
because no evidence was presented of fraud, self-dealing, bad faith,
or oppressive conduct.156 Writing for the court, Justice Edward J.
Greenfield stated, “[a] complaint which alleges merely that some
course of action other than that pursued by the board of directors
would have been more advantageous gives rise to no cognizable
cause of action.”157 He continued, “[t]he directors’ room rather than
the courtroom is the appropriate forum for thrashing out purely
business questions which will have an impact on profits, market
prices, competitive situations, or tax advantages.”158 The court also
stated that it did not matter if the directors acted “imprudently” as
long as they acted in good faith.159 Importantly, he did
acknowledge, “[a]ll directors have an obligation, using sound
business judgment, to maximize income for the benefit of all
persons having a stake in the welfare of the corporate entity.”160
However, the court will not interfere in the absence of “a clear
case . . . of fraud, oppression, arbitrary action, or breach of
trust.”161 In short, the decision to engage in tax avoidance remains
within the discretion of the board.162
In recent opinions, Delaware courts have continued this
tradition of employing the business judgment presumption to give
corporate managers broad discretion in determining tax strategy.
In Freedman v. Adams,163 the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed
a decision of the Court of Chancery of Delaware and held that tax
strategy decisions represent “a classic exercise of business
judgment.”164 In that case, Susan Freedman, a stockholder of XTO
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
1976).
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id. at 815.
Id. at 812.
Id. at 812–13.
Id. at 813.
Kamin v. American Express Co., 86 Misc.2d 809, 814 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Id. at 815.
Id.
58 A.3d 414 (Del. 2013).
Id. at 417.
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Energy Inc., brought a derivative suit that alleged the board of
directors had committed waste by adopting an executive bonus
plan that failed to make its payments tax deductible under the
Internal Revenue Code.165 She alleged that a plan could have been
fashioned that this would have resulted in an approximately $40
million savings for the corporation.166 The court held that the
business judgment presumption protected the board, even if their
decision was a bad one, because the board should have flexibility
in making tax strategy determinations.167
In addition to that case, the Court of Chancery of Delaware
also addressed the application of the business judgment
presumption to tax strategy decisions in Seinfeld v. Slager.168 In
that case, Frank Seinfeld, a stockholder of Republic Services, Inc.,
brought a derivative suit against members of the board of directors
relating to the corporation’s compensation decisions.169
Specifically, he asserted that various compensation to be paid was
waste because it was not tax deductible under § 162(m) of the
Internal Revenue Code.170 As characterized by the court, Seinfeld
was claiming that “there is an independent duty to minimize taxes,
or alternatively that the failure to minimize taxes is per se a waste
of corporate assets.”171 Although the court was unwilling to state
that the decision to pursue or forgo tax savings is never a breach
of fiduciary duty, the court held, “a decision to pursue or forgo tax
savings is generally a business decision for the board of
directors.”172 The court was willing to hold unequivocally that
“there is no separate duty to minimize taxes, and a failure to do so
is not automatically a waste of corporate assets.”173 As a
consequence, corporate managers have broad discretion in how
they formulate tax strategies, and while true in general, the Dodge
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 416–17.
Id.
Id. at 417.
No. 6462–VCG, 2012 WL 2501105 (Del. Ch. June 29, 2012).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
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mandate provides very little guidance as to what tax strategy
should be pursued in any particular situation.
IV. Essentialist Theories of the Corporation
In the search for guidance on the acceptability of tax
avoidance, Professor Karie Davis-Nozemack and I have argued
elsewhere that at least in part social science theories from fields
such as corporate social responsibility, business ethics, and
economics should be used to fill the void.174 Still, while such
theories may provide some direction in filling in the gaps, one must
wonder whether the law offers any other binding mandates on
corporate managers. One place to look is the essential nature of
the corporate form itself. Because the corporation is at least in part
a legal construct, understanding the nature of the form helps to
explain the legal requirements placed upon its managers.175
To begin, a few brief words ought to be said about the history
of the corporate form as a precursor to exploring the prevailing
essentialist theories of the corporation because it will help to
explain how these theories developed. Although the ancestors of
modern corporations are found in a variety of cultures, one obvious
place to start is ancient Rome because the term “corporation”
derives from the Latin term “corpus” which means “body of the
people.”176 In ancient Rome, the state recognized various entities
174. See Chaffee & Davis-Nozemack, supra note 25, at 1473–80 (discussing
various social science fields that may be helpful to corporate managers in
addressing corporate tax avoidance decision-making).
175. See Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy, 102 MINN.
L. REV. 1951, 1952 (2018) (“[C]orporations are wealth-producing socioeconomic
legal constructs that should profit shareholders . . . .”); Omer Tene & Jules
Polonetsky, Taming the Golem: Challenges of Ethical Algorithmic
Decision-Making, 19 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 125, 142–43 (2017) (“Corporations are
legal constructs intended to maximize profit and shareholder value.”); Felix T.
Wu, The Commercial Difference, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2005, 2014 (2017)
(“[C]orporations are legal constructs to which legal rights or duties can attach,
just as they can to individuals.”).
176. See Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate
Responsibility: Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135, 1161 n.126
(2012) (“The etymology of the word ‘corporation’ comes from the Latin ‘corpus,’
which means ‘body,’ as in a ‘corps’ or group of people.”); Michael J. Kelly, “Never
Again”? German Chemical Corporation Complicity in the Kurdish Genocide, 31
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 348, 350 (2013) (“From the Latin corpus for body,
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that had a separate identity from the people who composed them,
and in addition to being referred to by the term “corpus,” these
organizations were referred to by other names, including
“collegium” and “universitas.”177 These entities had strong ties to
the communities in which they existed and were organized for
social purposes such as asylums, burial societies, homes for the
poor, homes for the aged, hospitals, orphanages, political clubs,
and religious societies.178 These entities even included
municipalities and the Roman state itself.179
The attributes of the modern corporation developed over time.
During the thirteenth century, the Roman Catholic Church played
a major role in this development when Sinibaldo Fieschi, who went
on to become Pope Innocent IV, developed the concept of persona
ficta, which entailed the idea of fictitious legal personhood for
non-corporeal entities.180 During the Middle Ages, England began
corporations have been around since Roman times.”).
177. See Brian M. McCall, The Corporation as Imperfect Society, 36 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 509, 517, 529 n.93 (2011) (“In addition to universitas, the corporation was
also referred to by the words, corpus (body) and collegium (college).”); Ian D.
McClure, From a Patent Market for Lemons to a Marketplace for Patents:
Benchmarking IP in Its Evolution to Asset Class Status, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 759,
765– 66 (2015) (“In the early sixth century, Roman law recognized various types
of municipal-led, political or religious-focused corporations under the names
universitas, corpus, or collegium.”); Sean M. O’Connor, Hired to Invent vs. Work
Made for Hire: Resolving the Inconsistency Among Rights of Corporate
Personhood, Authorship, and Inventorship, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1227, 1230
(2012) (“The term and concept ‘corporation’ derived from the universitas, corpus,
and collegium of Roman law.”).
178. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 216 (1983) (reporting that in ancient Rome, “many
private associations, including organizations for maintaining a religious cult,
burial clubs, political clubs, and guilds of craftsmen or traders, were considered
to be corporations”).
179. See id. at 215 (discussing the origins of the corporate form in ancient
Roman law); Bruce P. Frohnen, The One and Many: Individual Rights, Corporate
Rights and the Diversity of Groups, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 789, 807 (2005) (“Corporate
entities, including municipalities, trade guilds and burial societies, were known
in Roman law from the earliest times.”).
180. See Nicholas P. Cafardi, The Availability of Parish Assets for Diocesan
Debts: A Canonical Analysis, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 361, 362 (2005) (“The
Canon law of the Roman Catholic Church was the first legal system in the world
to develop the notion of a fictitious legal personality. . . . [T]he term persona
ficta . . . [was] actually used for the first time . . . by . . . , Sinibaldo Fieschi in the
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allowing the creation of corporations for charitable purposes,181
and the English government started to recognize perpetual
existence for incorporated ecclesiastical, municipal, and charitable
entities.182 During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the
English government chartered corporations to develop newly
conquered lands and began creating corporations for overseas
trading, which popularized private stock ownership of
corporations.183 Throughout this period, the Crown and later
Parliament retained exclusive power to grant corporate charters

mid-thirteenth century.”); Erin Sheley, Perceptual Harm and the Corporate
Criminal, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 225, 239 (2012) (“Pope Innocent IV is generally
credited with the first articulation of the ‘legal fiction’ view of the corporation for
his description of ecclesiastical bodies as both distinct entities as a matter of social
fact, yet spiritually personae fictae—lacking a body or will and thus not
susceptible of excommunication.”); Mary Szto, Limited Liability Morality:
Fiduciary Duties in Historical Context, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 61, 109 (2004)
(“Canon law . . . influenced the development of the corporation . . . . Sinibaldo
Fieschi, also known as Sinibaldus Fliscus, is known as the father of modern
corporations theory. In the thirteenth century he wrote about ‘persona ficta,’
which led to the notion of ‘legal persons.’”).
181. See Blair, supra note 31, at 789 (“The earliest corporations were not
organized for business purposes. Corporate law as we know it today evolved out
of laws and practices governing municipalities, churches, and religious
institutions in Europe during the Middle Ages.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas
Walter, Originalist or Original: The Difficulties of Reconciling Citizens United
with Corporate Law History, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 877, 891 (2016) (“The first
corporations chartered in Europe in the Middle Ages were not business
corporations. Rather, they were religious, municipal, and benevolent
corporations.”).
182. See ALAN R. PALMITER, CORPORATIONS 7 (6th ed. 2009) (offering a
historical overview of corporations).
183. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalization of Corporate Law: The End
of History or a Never-Ending Story, 86 WASH. L. REV. 475, 481 (2011) (“Today’s
corporations derive from the English and continental European joint-stock
companies formed late in the sixteenth and early in the seventeenth centuries to
engage in trade with the Far East.”); Jenny S. Martinez, New Territorialism and
Old Territorialism, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1387, 1408 (2014) (“European
nations . . . outsourced empire to business enterprises. An important predecessor
of the modern business corporation was the joint stock company, which flourished
with European exploration, trade, and expansion in the seventeenth century.”);
Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, supra note 31, at 1632 (“By the late
sixteenth century, several European countries had begun chartering corporations
to develop foreign trade and colonies. Some of these early corporations, such as
the East India Company and the Hudson Bay Company, became well-known
players in American colonial times.”).
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and create corporations, which meant corporations could only be
formed through the direct action of the government.184
During the colonial period and early days of the United States,
corporations could still only be created by specific act of the
government. In practice, this meant that corporations were
bespoke entities brought to life through bills passed by state
legislatures and signed by state governors, and any alteration to a
corporation’s charter had to occur through a similar process.185 As
a result, a relatively small number of corporations existed during
this period and most served relatively public functions, such as
building and operating canals, bridges, and roads or operating
banks or insurance companies, and state legislatures regularly
granted corporate charters to noncommercial associations, such as
charities, churches, and universities.186 During the nineteenth
184. See Ryan Bubb, Choosing the Partnership: English Business
Organization Law During the Industrial Revolution, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 337,
340 (2015) (“Until 1844, [in England,] corporations could only be formed by an act
of Parliament or a charter granted by the Crown.”); Beth Stephens, The Amorality
of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
45, 55 (2002) (“Until well into the nineteenth century, corporations could be
formed only by an act of the government—the king or Parliament in England, or
the state legislatures in the United States.”).
185. See Colin P. Marks, Jiminy Cricket for the Corporation: Understanding
the Corporate “Conscience”, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 1129, 1131 (2008) (“The earliest
forms of the corporation in America came by specific charters from the states in
the late eighteenth century, which were carried-over from the colonial days when
corporations obtained charters directly from the King of England.”); Celia R.
Taylor, The Inadequacy of Fiduciary Duty Doctrine: Why Corporate Managers
Have Little to Fear and What Might Be Done About It, 85 OR. L. REV. 993, 997
(2006) (“This conceptualization of the corporation clearly gave strong regulatory
control to states through their exclusive and individualized charter authority.
State legislatures, carrying on the work of the colonial assemblies, issued special
charters conferring limited rights to corporations.”); Christopher J. Wolfe, “An
Artificial Being”: John Marshall and Corporate Personhood, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 201, 204 (2017) (“Initially, colonial governments were granted this power
by the King’s agents; after the colonies broke away and created new state
governments, the power to create corporate persons was considered part of the
sovereign power of the state governments.”).
186. See Margaret M. Blair, A Contractarian Defense of Corporate
Philanthropy, 28 STETSON L. REV. 27, 42 (1998) (“[T]he earliest corporations were
formed only upon the grant of a special charter by the crown, or in the early
United States, by state charter, and these charters nearly always specified some
sort of public purpose.”); Stefan J. Padfield, In Search of a Higher Standard:
Rethinking Fiduciary Duties of Directors of Wholly-Owned Subsidiaries, 10
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century, states began to adopt general incorporation statutes,
which allowed private individuals to form corporations without
seeking an act of the state legislature, as Americans began to
embrace competition, markets, and industrialization.187 The
modern corporation quickly came to dominate business in the
United States.188
As will be explained below, throughout the history of the
United States, three prevailing theories of the corporation were
developed, i.e., artificial entity theory, real entity theory, and

FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 79, 87 (2004) (“[I]n the colonial United States, the
responsibility for granting charters fell to the legislature. These charters were
initially granted primarily to further various public works projects and, like in
England, were handed out on a case-by-case basis.”); Ann M. Scarlett,
Shareholder Derivative Litigation’s Historical and Normative Foundations, 61
BUFF. L. REV. 837, 899–900 (2013) (“In colonial times, corporations were created
by royal charters just as they were in England, and only local public service
corporations were well represented.”).
187. See Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa C. Leibowitz, Monopolies and the
Constitution: A History of Crony Capitalism, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 983, 1071
(2013) (“It was not until the development of general incorporation laws, beginning
in the mid-nineteenth century, that corporate law in the United States ceased to
be a field of special grants of privilege to a few individuals.”); Henry Hansmann
& Mariana Pargendler, The Evolution of Shareholder Voting Rights: Separation
of Ownership and Consumption, 123 YALE L.J. 948, 993–94 (2014) (“[G]eneral
incorporation laws, which allowed firms to incorporate without the need to obtain
special legislative charters and conferred no exclusive privileges, gradually
became dominant after the mid-nineteenth century; by the end of the century,
they were the typical basis for incorporation . . . .”); Elizabeth Pollman,
Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 639, 647 (2016) (“Over the
course of the nineteenth century, states moved from a system of exclusively
granting charters by discretionary special acts of the legislature to a system in
which . . . businesses could seek a corporate charter without specific involvement
of the legislature.”).
188. See Lynn A. Stout, On the Nature of Corporations, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV.
253, 256 (2005) (“[T]he corporation has evolved into the dominant business form
for pursuing certain kinds of large, long-term economic projects.”); Kevin M.
Teeven, Decline of Freedom of Contract Since the Emergence of the Modern
Business Corporation, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 117, 119 (1992) (“Corporations grew in
importance in the 1860s and became the dominant business form in the 1880s
and 1890s . . . .”); Harwell Wells, “Corporation Law Is Dead”: Heroic
Managerialism, Legal Change, and the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the Height
of the American Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 305, 313 (2013) (“[B]y late in the
nineteenth century the corporate form was a commonplace frame for business
organizations, its adoption made easy by the passage of general incorporation
statutes during the century, and giant corporations had become an increasingly
common feature of the economic landscape, beginning with the railroads.”).
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aggregate theory.189 At one time or another, each of these theories
was dominant.190 However, as will also be explained below,
although each of these theories has its attractiveness, none of them
fully define what a corporation is. As a result, some have advocated
for embracing the indeterminacy of the corporation by embracing
all of the theories at once, despite conceptual inconsistencies.191
Each of the prevailing theories of the corporation will be examined
below, and this will set the stage for a discussion of my theory of
the corporation—collaboration theory.
A. Artificial Entity Theory
Artificial entity theory, which is also referred to as concession
theory, asserts that corporations are artificial entities that owe
their existence completely to a concession by the government, i.e.,
a government grant of specific rights and privileges.192 The
government creates these entities to achieve goals that it does not
have time, money, or other resources to achieve.193 Under this
189. See infra Parts IV.A–C (exploring the prevailing essentialist theories of
the corporation, i.e., artificial entity theory, real entity theory, and aggregate
theory).
190. See infra notes 197, 206, 211 and accompanying text.
191. See infra Part IV.D (discussing the claim that the best course of action
in determining the essential nature of the corporation is to embrace its
indeterminacy by embracing all of the prevailing essentialist theories of the
corporation, despite the logical inconsistencies created by such an approach).
192. See Vincent S.J. Buccola, Corporate Rights and Organizational
Neutrality, 101 IOWA L. REV. 499, 506–07 (2016) (“‘[A]rtificial entity’ or
‘concession’ theory . . . focuses on the sense in which the corporation owes its very
existence to the state’s largesse.”); Harper Ho, supra note 31, at 891–92 (“[T]he
concession or ‘artificial entity’ theory . . . sees the corporation as a creation of the
state or sovereign that grants its charter . . . .”); David Min, Corporate Political
Activity and Non-Shareholder Agency Costs, 33 YALE J. REG. 423, 442 n.83 (2016)
(“For much of its history, the corporation was understood as an organizational
form that was granted by the state and which owed its existence to the state.”).
193. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 54, at 12 (“Under the artificial entity view,
the corporation owes its existence to the state and is granted certain privileges in
order to be able to fulfill functions that the state would like to achieve.”); Nathan
Oman, Corporations and Autonomy Theories of Contract: A Critique of the New
Lex Mercatoria, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 101, 115 (2005) (“The concession theory
claims that the corporation is a creation of the state that exercises delegated
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theory, the corporation’s rights and obligations are defined by the
government that provided for its existence.194 As a result, the
government retains the power to define the scope of corporate
activity, regulate corporate behavior, and punish corporations that
fall short of the government’s mandates.195
Artificial entity is the original conception of the corporation.
As previously discussed, corporations originally could be created
only through an act of the government, and this tradition was
carried on from medieval England throughout the early days of the
United States.196 As a consequence, artificial entity theory was
dominant during this period.197 This dominance was so pronounced
authority to serve the purposes of the government . . . .”); Padfield, Rehabilitating
Concession Theory, supra note 31, at 332 (“[T]he concession theory of the . . . views
the corporation as a tremendous capital accumulation device that was only made
possible by the state conveying certain privileges to incorporators . . . [to] achieve
goals that might otherwise fail for lack of funding.”).
194. See Atiba R. Ellis, Citizens United and Tiered Personhood, 44 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 717, 737 (2011) (“This ‘artificial person’ or ‘concession’ theory
rested on the view that a corporation effectively exists at the sufferance of the
state and, therefore, is not entitled to any rights or protections not granted to it
by statute.”); Roger M. Michalski, Rights Come With Responsibilities: Personal
Jurisdiction in the Age of Corporate Personhood, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 125, 136
(2013) (“[C]orporations under the artificial entity framework had no political
rights as they were conceived as purely economic entities, created by the state
and subject to significant control and regulation.”); J. Janewa OseiTutu,
Corporate “Human Rights” to Intellectual Property Protection?, 55 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 1, 42 (2015) (“[T]he concession theory postulates that corporations are
created by the state and have only the rights that are granted to them by the
state.”).
195. See Carliss N. Chatman, Judgment Without Notice: The
Unconstitutionality of Constructive Notice Following Citizens United, 105 KY. L.J.
49, 58 n.48 (2016) (“The artificial entity theory envisions corporations as state
approved entities, which exist at the pleasure of the government, are
non-corporeal, and may be subject to more extensive regulation than a natural
person due to this privileged position.”); John C. Coates IV, Note, State Takeover
Statutes and Corporate Theory: The Revival of an Old Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
806, 828 (1989) (“Under a pure artificial entity theory, a corporation can be
regulated in any manner the state desires.”); Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession
Theory, supra note 31, at 333 (“Under concession theory, the state retains
significant presumptive authority to regulate the corporate entity in exchange for
granting this bundle of rights to incorporators.”).
196. See supra notes 184–85 (discussing how corporations were formed in
England, colonial America, and during the early days of the United States).
197. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Moving Beyond Animal Rights: A
Legal/Contractualist Critique, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 27, 54 (2009) (“The artificial
entity theory dominated the first part of the 1800s.”); Jess M. Krannich, The

138

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 93 (2019)

that in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,198 the
Supreme Court of the United States explicitly adopted artificial
entity theory.199 Writing on behalf of the Court, Chief Justice John
Marshall stated:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and
existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature
of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of
its creation confers upon it either expressly or as incidental to
its very existence. These are such as are supposed best
calculated to effect the object for which it was created. Among
the most important are immortality, and, if the expression may
be allowed, individuality; properties by which a perpetual
succession of many persons are considered as the same, and
may act as a single individual. They enable a corporation to
manage its own affairs and to hold property without the
perplexing intricacies, the hazardous and endless necessity, of
perpetual conveyances for the purpose of transmitting it from
hand to hand.200

Although proponents of artificial entity still exist today, the
Court’s holding likely represents the point of artificial entity
theory’s greatest popularity.
With the advent of general incorporation statutes in the early
and mid-1800s, the popularity of the artificial entity theory waned
as the role of state governments in forming corporations was

Corporate “Person”: A New Analytical Approach to a Flawed Method of
Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 71 (2005) (“The artificial
entity metaphor remained the dominant view of the corporate entity through
much of the nineteenth century, and it remains prevalent in corporate theory as
well as constitutional law today.”); Marcantel, supra note 31, at 225 (“[I]t is
unequivocal that concessionary theory was a dominant theory in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.”).
198. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
199. See id. at 636 (explaining the form and function of the corporate entity
in the United States).
200. Id.
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reduced.201 As a result, many corporate law theorists began to
re-conceptualize the corporation as a real entity.202
B. Real Entity Theory
Real entity theory, which is also known as natural entity
theory, is another prevailing essentialist theory of the corporation.
Real entity theory posits that the corporation is an entity separate
and apart from the individuals organizing, owning, and operating
it.203 Unlike artificial entity theory, real entity theory suggests that
the corporation does not owe its existence to the state, but it is a
product of the group identity of the individuals organizing, owning,
201. See Colombo, supra note 31, at 11 (“General incorporation statutes
sounded the death knell of concession theory—the notion that corporations are
creations of the state.”); Ripken, supra note 31, at 220 (“By the mid-nineteenth
century, special chartering gave way to general incorporation statutes. . . . The
idea that corporations existed only because of the concession of the state held far
less force . . . .”); Gerald J. Russello, Catholic Social Thought and the Large
Multinational Corporation, 46 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 107, 130–31 (2007)
(“Changes in law and business practice in the early twentieth century changed
the understanding of the corporation from a state-chartered entity towards a view
that understood the corporation as a ‘natural entity’ established by the
incorporators and shareholders, with only minimal state involvement.”).
202. See Nicole Bremner Càsarez, Corruption, Corrosion, and Corporate
Political Speech, 70 NEB. L. REV. 689, 718–19 (1991) (“Philosophical questions
about the nature of corporations had fascinated German and French political
thinkers during the nineteenth century. Otto von Gierke, in particular, advanced
the idea that groups (and, therefore, corporations) are natural extensions of
human society.”); Anthony W. Kraus, Absolute Protection for Intracorporate
Personnel Communications Under Defamation Law: A Philosophical Reappraisal
of the Nonpublication Doctrine, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 155, 171 (1994) (“Attention to
the subject of corporate legal status increased greatly in Europe during the second
half of the nineteenth century. The fictive view of corporations was rejected by
the leading German scholar of the time, Otto von Gierke.”); Michalski, supra note
31, at 136 (“Beginning in the late nineteenth century, natural entity theory
replaced the conception of the corporation as an artificial creation of state law.”).
203. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the
Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 59 (1990) (“[T]he real or natural entity
theory of corporations held that the corporation was an entity separate from its
members.”); Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, supra note 31, at
1641– 42 (“Also known as the natural entity or person theory, [the real entity
theory] regarded the corporation as a real entity with a separate existence from
its shareholders and from the state.”); Sloan G. Speck, The Social Boundaries of
Corporate Taxation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2583, 2591 (2016) (“[T]he ‘real entity’
theory treats corporations as distinct legal persons with specific rights and
obligations not linked to those of their owners.”).
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and operating the business form.204 As a result of this collective
personality, some proponents of this theory suggest that the
corporation possesses human rights that emerge from the separate
identity of the group.205
Although advocates for real entity theory have existed
throughout the history of the United States and even today, real
entity theory was the dominant essentialist theory of the
corporation throughout the second half of the nineteenth century
and much of the twentieth century.206 As a result of the widespread
204. See Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of
Organizational “Real Entity” Theory, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 575, 580 (1989) (“The
real entity paradigm implied that corporations owe their existence and legitimacy
to the distinct and unified purposes and wills of groups.”); Teemu Ruskola, What
Is a Corporation? Liberal, Confucian, and Socialist Theories of Enterprise
Organization (and State, Family, and Personhood), 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 639,
659 (2014) (discussing “the views of late nineteenth-century ‘real entity’ theorists
for whom the corporation was effectively a kind of super-person, a metaphysically
real entity in its own right, the existence of which preceded law whose main task
was merely to declare its social existence”); Kenya J.H. Smith, Incomplete
Sentences: Hobby Lobby’s Corporate Religious Rights, the Criminally Culpable
Corporate Soul, and the Case for Greater Alignment of Organizational and
Individual Sentencing, 77 LA. L. REV. 75, 92–93 (2016) (“[T]he real entity
theory . . . embraces the explanation of corporations as a natural consequence of
group dynamics, analogous to a family, religious congregation, or other types of
assemblies formed by groups of natural persons.”).
205. See Marcantel, supra note 31, at 222 n.7 (“In the constitutional sense,
real entity theory posits that the corporation, as an entity, is entitled to
constitutional protection independent of its shareholders.”); Dalia Tsuk Mitchell,
Status Bound: The Twentieth Century Evolution of Directors’ Liability, 5 N.Y.U.
J.L. & BUS. 63, 84 (2009) (“Natural entity theory described corporations as
separate entities, distinct from their individual members and having real
existence, with rights and liabilities similar to those of persons (specifically,
constitutional rights and criminal and tort liabilities).”); Seema Mohapatra, Time
to Lift the Veil of Inequality in Health-Care Coverage: Using Corporate Law to
Defend the Affordable Care Act, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 137, 162 (2015) (“The
real entity theory suggests that as a corporation is separate and apart, the
corporation has a ‘collective consciousness’ that is separate and apart from those
who manage its operations. Therefore, it is said that a corporation may then be
considered a person under the law and entitled to legal rights that would
naturally flow to any person.”).
206. See Krannich, supra note 197, at 85 (“[T]he real entity theory became the
most prominent definition of the corporate ‘person’ in the early twentieth
century.”); Michael J. Phillips, Reappraising the Real Entity Theory of the
Corporation, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1061, 1068 (1994) (“The . . . real entity theory
of the corporation, also known as natural-entity theory, was influential from the
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adoption of general incorporation statutes during the 1800s,
corporate theorists’ focus on the role of the state lessened, and they
searched for a new answer to the metaphysical question of what is
the essential nature of the corporation.207 Ultimately, they looked
to European corporate legal theorists in their search, and
specifically, the work of German legal theorist Otto von Gierke,
who suggested that groups of individuals take on a separate
“collective spirit” from the individuals that compose them, which
he believed applied to corporations as well.208 American corporate
law theorists imported this idea to the United States.209
end of the [nineteenth] century until at least the 1920s.”); Susanna Kim Ripken,
Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to the Corporate
Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 112 (2009) (“At the turn of
the 20th Century, the real entity, or natural entity theory became the popular
way of describing the corporate person.”).
207. See supra notes 205–02 and accompanying text (discussing the transition
from artificial entity theory to real entity theory as the dominant essentialist
theory of the corporation).
208. See Martin Gelter & Geneviève Helleringer, Lift Not the Painted Veil! To
Whom Are Directors’ Duties Really Owed?, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1069, 1089 n.112
(“In German law, the name of Otto von Gierke is typically associated with the
‘entity’ theory of the corporation. Gierke understood legal personality as the
reflection of social reality and argued that individuals would form fellowships that
developed an autonomous existence necessary for their social fulfillment.”);
Iuliano, supra note 31, at 80 (“Otto von Gierke and Frederic Maitland are two of
the most notable thinkers who advanced the position that group agents are
emergent entities. According to them, a collective consciousness springs forth
from the associations of individuals within corporations.”); Oman, supra note 193,
at 116 (“The real theory of the corporation received its most forceful statement in
German legal thought. . . . Otto Gierke became the proponent of this approach in
the context of corporate law.”).
209. See Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075, 2132 (2016) (“[T]he ‘real entity’ theory [is] a late
nineteenth-century theory exported from Germany to England and the United
States as a basis for the legal rights of business organizations.”); Ron Harris, The
Transplantation of the Legal Discourse on Corporate Personality Theories: From
German Codification to British Political Pluralism and American Big Business,
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1421, 1422–23 (2006) (“The German-Gierkian real entity
theory of the corporation journeyed through several contexts and discourses in
Britain and the United States. It inspired numerous articles and books in English,
French and German.”); Ian B. Lee, Corporate Law, Profit Maximization and the
“Responsible” Shareholder, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 31, 40 (2005) (“Under the
influence of German theorists who suggested that corporate legal personality
translated the corporation’s existence as a real entity separate from its
shareholders, the corporation came increasingly to be viewed as an institution in
its own right, rather than as the shareholders in special form.”).
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C. Aggregate Theory

The aggregate theory, which is also known as the nexus of
contracts theory, is the third prevailing essentialist theory of the
corporation. Although this theory initially developed in the
nineteenth century,210 it took until the second half of the twentieth
century to become the dominant theory of the corporation, and it
remains so today.211 Under this theory, the corporation consists of
individuals organizing, owning, and operating it.212 Some
proponents of this theory extend it to include other parties, such

210. See Cupp, Jr., supra note 197, at 55 (“The aggregate entity theory of
corporate personhood was . . . invoked beginning in the 1800s, and it reached
prominence in the latter half of the century.”); Iuliano, supra note 31, at 58
(“During the late nineteenth century, corporations were reconceived as objects of
private, not government, creation. . . . Corporations had become collective entities
that derived their powers from the individuals who comprised them.”); Phillips,
supra note 206, at 1065 (“[D]uring the latter part of the nineteenth century some
theorists began to use partnership analogies to describe the corporation, thereby
characterizing it as an aggregate formed by private contracting among its human
parts.”).
211. See Brett McDonnell, ESOPs’ Failures: Fiduciary Duties When Managers
of Employee-Owned Companies Vote to Entrench Themselves, 2000 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 199, 246 (“The dominant view in law and economics scholarship treats
corporations as a nexus of contracts.”); Meredith R. Miller, Contracting Out of
Process, Contracting Out of Corporate Accountability: An Argument Against
Enforcement of Pre-Dispute Limits on Process, 75 TENN. L. REV. 365, 365–66
(2008) (“In the field of corporate law, the ‘nexus of contract’ model is the dominant
theoretical explanation of the law concerning the management of corporations.
Under this view, corporations are nothing more than a network of contracts
between voluntary, private actors.”); Rachel F. Moran, Whatever Happened to
Racism?, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 899, 924–25 (2005) (“Corporate law scholars have
themselves questioned images of personhood, but the dominant response has been
to characterize corporations as nothing more than a nexus of efficient contracts
dedicated to the maximization of shareholder wealth.”).
212. See Marcantel, supra note 31, at 222 n.6 (“Aggregate theory posits that
corporations are conduits through which collections of individuals conduct
business.”); Stefan J. Padfield, Corporate Social Responsibility & Concession
Theory, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 26–27 (2015) (“The aggregate view rejected
the fiction of the corporation as an artificial entity that was promoted by
concession theory, and instead focused on the property rights of the underlying
shareholders to conceive of the corporation as simply an association of
individuals.”); Petrin, supra note 31, at 34 (“According to the nexus of contracts
model, the firm consists of various explicit and implicit contracts between a firm’s
constituencies . . . .”).
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as creditors, employees, and customers.213 Unlike the artificial
entity theory and real entity theory, under the aggregate theory,
the corporation has no separate existence from the individuals
composing it.214 The rights of the corporation are derived from
those individuals.215
As the real entity theory gained prominence in the late
nineteenth century and early twentieth century, business scholars
wanted the opportunity to do deeper economic analysis of the firm.
In 1937, Ronald Coase published his seminal article, The Nature
of the Firm, which served as a foundation for modern analysis of
the firm as a nexus of contracts.216 After a period of dormancy of
213. See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Representing Social Enterprise, 20 CLINICAL L.
REV. 215, 242 (2013) (“Dominant modern corporate law theory describes a
corporation as a ‘nexus of contracts’. Under this widely-accepted theory, the
corporation is a nexus of a set of contracts among the firm’s constituents which
include its shareholders, as providers of capital, but also its employees, creditors,
suppliers, and board of directors”); Usha Rodrigues, Entity and Identity, 60
EMORY L.J. 1257, 1273 (2011) (“The dominant metaphor for the corporation is the
‘nexus of contracts’: The firm in this view serves a coordinating function among
managers, shareholders, suppliers, and consumers.”); Adam F. Scales, Following
Form: Corporate Succession and Liability Insurance, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 573, 576
(2011) (“Dominant for now is the view that a corporation is a nexus of contracts
among labor, capital, and management.”).
214. See J. Haskell Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, 118 W. VA.
L. REV. 25, 40–41 (2015) (“The nexus-of-contracts theory . . . view[s] the
corporation not as a separate entity, but as an accumulation of private contracts
between stakeholders.”); Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory, supra note
31, at 841 (reporting that the nexus-of-contract theory views the corporation “as
a mere aggregation of natural individuals that is a product of private initiative
serving a predominantly private function.”); Phillips, supra note 206, at 1071
(“[T]he nexus-of-contracts theory refuses to recognize a meaningful corporate
entity distinct from the components that form the corporation.”).
215. See Coates, supra note 195, at 815 n.50 (“Under the aggregate theory,
the extent to which a corporation may be said to have ‘rights,’ especially
constitutional rights, corresponds to the rights of the individuals which make it
up.”); Iuliano, supra note 31, at 60 (“Under the aggregate entity theory,
corporations were only capable of possessing rights that could be attributed to a
collection of individuals.”); Petrin, supra note 31, at 9–10 (“The ‘aggregate’ or
‘contractualist’ theory asserted that corporations . . . constituted aggregations of
natural persons. . . . [B]oth a legal entity’s legal rights and duties were often
seen . . . as simply those of its shareholders or other individuals that made up the
entity.”).
216. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); see also
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors As Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 9 (2002) (“The dominant model of the corporation in legal scholarship is
the so-called nexus of contracts theory. This model’s origins fairly can be traced
to Nobel Prize laureate Ronald Coase’s justly famous article, The Nature of the
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the debate over the essential nature of the corporation, which will
be discussed in the next Part, the aggregate theory of the
corporation emerged as the dominant theory of the corporation as
a result of the interweaving of law and economics that began
during the late 1970s and early 1980s because the aggregate
theory is well suited to allow economic analysis of the corporate
form.217
D. Indeterminacy
Some scholars have argued for accepting all of the prevailing
essentialist theories of the corporation at the same time and
embracing the indeterminacy of the corporation.218 Each of the
prevailing theories of the corporation has its virtues and
Firm.”); Oman, supra note 193, at 124 (“The modern nexus of contract theory of
the corporation traces its origin to a 1937 article by Ronald Coase.”); J. Gregory
Sidak, Mr. Justice Nemo’s Social Statics, 79 TEX. L. REV. 737, 745 (2001) (“Coase’s
insight that the firm is the nexus of contracts between the owners of various
factors of production also has gained widespread acceptance among legal
scholars.”).
217. See Harper Ho, supra note 31, at 895 (“Since the rise of the law and
economics movement, dominant thinking about the nature of the corporation has
coalesced around an aggregate theory of the corporation that sees the corporation
as a ‘nexus of contracts.’”); Charles R.T. O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur and the
Theory of the Modern Corporation, 31 J. CORP. L. 753, 763 (2006) (“Though it is
impossible to date precisely, the Nexus-of-Contracts Paradigm achieved
dominance in the field of corporation law near the end of the 1970s.”); Susan J.
Stabile, A Catholic Vision of the Corporation, 4 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 181, 211
n.48 (2005) (“The law and economics view, which sees the corporation as a nexus
of contracts, has been the dominant model for thinking about the regulation of
corporations.”).
218. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A
Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 464 (1989) (“Whatever the future
interplay of theory and power, the concepts that make up theories of the
firm— entity and aggregate, contract and concession, public and private, discrete
and relational—will stay in internal opposition. This tendency toward
contradiction should be accepted, not feared.”); David Million, Theories of the
Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 262 (“Confronted with important political
challenges, theories of the corporation have always been fundamentally
indeterminate.”); Fenner L. Stewart, Jr., Indeterminacy and Balance: A Path to a
Wholesome Corporate Law, 9 RUTGERS BUS. L. REV. 81, 85 (2012) (“[T]his article
recommends focusing upon the indeterminacy of corporate legal theories.”).
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drawbacks. The artificial entity theory celebrates the role of the
state in creating the corporation, while underplaying the separate
identity of the entity and the roles of the individuals organizing,
operating, and owning it.219 The real entity theory celebrates the
existence of the corporation as a distinct entity, while
underplaying the role of the state in creating it, and the roles of
the individuals organizing, owning, and operating it.220 Finally, the
aggregate theory celebrates the roles of the individuals organizing,
operating, and owning the corporation, while underplaying the role
of the state in creating the entity and the existence of the
corporation as a distinct entity.221 The metaphysical inquiry into
the essential nature of the corporation is at heart the search for a
coherent definition of the corporation, and each of the theories
seems thin.
Some have argued that the best way to gain a robust
understanding of the corporation is to embrace all of the prevailing
theories of the corporation simultaneously.222 Embracing all of the
prevailing theories simultaneously is problematic, however,
because the theories do contradict each other. For example, the
artificial entity theory and the real entity conceive of the
corporation as a distinct entity,223 but the aggregate theory
conceives of the corporation as nothing more than a collection of
individuals.224 In terms of corporate rights, the artificial entity
theory suggests that all rights of the corporation are given and
defined by the state.225 However, the natural entity theory claims
that corporate rights derive from the separate identity of the
219. See supra Part IV.A (explaining artificial entity theory).
220. See supra Part IV.B (explaining real entity theory).
221. See supra Part IV.C (explaining aggregate theory).
222. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 192 and accompanying text (explaining that under the
artificial entity theory, the corporation is a distinct entity that is created by the
state); supra notes 203–04 and accompanying text (discussing that under the real
entity theory, the corporation is a separate entity created by the group identity of
the individuals composing it).
224. See supra note 214 and accompanying text (stating that under the
aggregate theory, the corporation has no separate identity from the individuals
composing it).
225. See supra note 194 and accompanying text (discussing that under the
artificial entity theory, the rights of the corporation are defined by the
government that provided for the corporation’s existence).
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group,226 and the aggregate theory argues that corporate rights are
derived from the individuals organizing, operating, and owning the
corporation as they interact with other participants in the firm and
with parties outside of the corporation.227 Put simply, accepting the
indeterminacy of the corporation means accepting conflicting
theories that cannot be meshed into a coherent understanding of
the corporation.
Famously, in The Historic Background of Corporate Legal
Personality,228 an article published in 1926, John Dewey wrote,
“The fact of the case is that there is no clear-cut line, logical or
practical, through the different theories which have been advanced
and which are still advanced in behalf of the ‘real’ personality of
either ‘natural’ or associated persons.”229 As a consequence, he
concluded:
As far as the historical survey implies a plea for anything, it is
a plea for disengaging specific issues and disputes which arise
from entanglement with any concept of personality which is
other than a restatement that such and such rights and duties,
benefits and burdens, accrue and are to be maintained and
distributed in such and such ways, and in such and such
situations.230

In short, he advocated to retreat from the debate by embracing all
of the prevailing theories of corporate personality at once, despite
the incoherence of that position.231 Remarkably, many scholars
adopted his position, and the debate over corporate personality did
not re-intensify until the early 1980s, when luminaries of the law

226. See supra note 205 and accompanying text (explaining that under the
real entity theory, the rights of the corporation emerge from the separate identity
of the group).
227. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (explaining that under the
aggregate theory, the rights of the corporation are derived from the rights of the
individuals organizing, owning, and operating the entity).
228. John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35
YALE L.J. 655 (1926).
229. Id. at 669.
230. Id.
231. See id.
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and economics movement reinvigorated the debate through
advocacy for the aggregate theory of personality.232
John Dewey’s proposal to embrace the indeterminacy of the
corporation is remarkably seductive. At heart, each of the
prevailing theories is an attempt to define what a corporation is.
The problem is that each theory is descriptively thin, downplaying
some attributes and favoring others.233 Despite the incoherence,
embracing all of the theories helps to offer a thicker definition of
the corporation. In addition, by ignoring the question of what a
corporation is, one has time for other pursuits, whatever those
might be. However, taking such a path seems wrong for a variety
of reasons. First, backing away from any intellectual pursuit
simply because it is difficult is not acceptable. Otherwise, a myriad
of human problems would never be solved. Second, theories of the
corporation matter now in a way that they have not in the past. As
cases like Citizens United234 and Hobby Lobby235 demonstrate, the
legal rights of corporations are evolving.236 For litigation of these
issues to occur properly, society must know what corporations are
in the first place. Third, none of the prevailing theories of the
corporation, even if joined together, provide a complete answer of
what is a corporation. Fourth, a better theory of the firm,
collaboration theory, exists.

232. See Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, supra note 31, at 1650
(“Many commentators view John Dewey’s 1926 Yale Law Journal article as
having put an end to the corporate personhood debate.”); David A. Skeel, Jr.,
Corporate Anatomy Lessons, 113 YALE L.J. 1519, 1527 (2004) (“[T]he debate [over
the essential nature of the corporation] is often viewed as having ended when the
pragmatist philosopher John Dewey published an article in this journal arguing
that the various views collapsed into each other, and each could be used to support
any outcome on a particular issue.”); Linda Sugin, Theories of the Corporation and
the Tax Treatment of Corporate Philanthropy, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 835, 866
n.144 (1997) (“The indeterminate nature of normative content in theories of the
corporation was argued by John Dewey in 1926. . . . Dewey’s article may have
been responsible for the sudden end of debate on the issue . . . .”).
233. See supra Part IV.A–C (providing an overview of the prevailing
essentialist theories of the corporation).
234. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
235. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
236. See Pollman, supra note 187, at 642 (“A new dynamic between federal
corporate rights and state corporate law has emerged . . . [w]ith the Court’s recent
decisions in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission and Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc. . . . .”).
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V. Collaboration Theory

In developing an essentialist theory of the corporation, one is
trying to define what is a corporation. Each of the prevailing
theories offers an incomplete definition of the corporation. As
previously discussed, each of the theories emphasizes certain
aspects of the firm, while underemphasizing other aspects.237 The
problem, however, is much deeper than that. Each of the theories
explains how the corporation exists but fails to explain why the
corporation exists. A proper theory of the corporation should do
both.
To state this issue a bit more concretely, consider how to define
a bridge. One could define a bridge as an artificial entity created
by the government. This would be the artificial entity theory of the
bridge.238 One also could also define a bridge simply as an object
that exists. This would be the real entity theory of the bridge.239
Finally, one could define a bridge as a sum of its parts in a certain
arrangement. This would be the aggregate theory of the bridge.240
The problem is that none of these theories offers a robust and
proper definition of what a bridge happens to be. A better
definition of a bridge would be “[a] structure spanning and
providing passage over an obstacle.”241 This definition provides an
explanation of how a bridge exists, i.e., as a “structure,” and why a
bridge exists, i.e., “providing passage over an obstacle.”242 In the
absence of answering both questions, one has not created a fully
formed definition of a bridge. The same is true with trying to
develop an essentialist theory of the corporation. This is especially
true if you want to draw normative implications from a theory of

237. See supra Part IV.D (discussing the reasons for embracing the
indeterminacy of the corporation).
238. See supra Part IV.A (providing an overview of the artificial entity theory
of the corporation).
239. See supra Part IV.B (providing an overview of the real entity theory of
the corporation).
240. See supra Part IV.C (providing an overview of the aggregate theory of
the corporation).
241. Bridge, WEBSTER’S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 138 (1995).
242. Id.
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the corporation.243 A more robust theory of the corporation yields
more robust normative conclusions.
Collaboration theory answers the questions of both how and
why corporations exist. Under this theory, which I have developed,
the corporation is a collaboration among the government and the
individuals organizing, operating, and owning the corporation.244
As a result, this theory explains how the corporation exists—as a
collaboration. Collaboration theory also explains why the
corporation exists. A collaboration can be defined as a common
effort between or among multiple entities to accomplish a task or
project.245 In regard to for-profit corporations, the common project
among the government and those organizing, operating, and
owning the entity is economic development and economic gain. The
interests of the parties do diverge somewhat. The state
government is interested in societal economic development and
economic gain,246 but the individuals organizing, operating, and
owning the corporation are looking for personal economic
development and gain.247 However, parties often enter into
243. See infra Part VI.A–B (discussing some of the normative implications of
collaboration theory).
244. Collaboration theory may be defined to include other parts, such as
creditors, customers, and the general public. The exact scope of the collaboration
and relationships among collaborating parties will be left for another day.
245. See Collaborate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 243 (11th
ed. 2006) (providing a definition of the term “collaborate”).
246. See Andrew I. Gavil, Competition and Cooperation on Sherman Island:
An Antitrust Ethnography, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1225, 1242 (1995) (reporting that
emergence of the modern corporation resulted from “a conscious government
policy of promoting economic growth, combined with the realization that the
needs of technological progress, particularly in transportation and
communication, demanded a more widely available cooperative mechanism for
raising capital”); H. C. Robinson, Shifted Personhood: Corporations, Technology,
and Law on the Path to Citizens United and Current Electoral Politics in the U.S.,
18 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 403, 405 n.9 (2016) (“By the end of the eighteenth
century, the new American states had become involved in the process of
promoting economic development by granting corporate charters and franchises
to private investors.”); Carl J. Schramm, Law Outside the Market: The Social
Utility of the Private Foundation, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 355, 364 (2006)
(“State legislatures . . . replaced ‘special’ incorporation statutes with ‘general’
incorporation laws to make it easier for people to pursue commercial aspirations,
opening the door to greater economic participation.”).
247. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (explaining that for-profit
corporations are created and are to be managed primarily to make a profit for
shareholders).
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arrangements referred to as collaborations with far more divergent
interests than those collaborating within the corporate form.248
Collaboration theory also offers a fuller view of the corporation
in other ways as well. For example, collaboration theory clarifies
why corporations have separate entity status. This theory achieves
this by building upon the work of Otto von Gierke, who argued that
groups have identities that are separate and distinct from the
individuals composing them.249 As mentioned above, Gierke’s work
helped popularize the real entity theory during the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.250 Collaboration theory takes Gierke’s
work one step further by arguing that because collaborations allow
individuals to achieve more than they ever could on their own that
the corporation should be viewed as having a separate and distinct
status from the government and the individuals organizing,
operating, and owning the entity.251
Collaboration theory also explains why the government has
the ability to regulate the rights of corporations to a greater degree
than actual human beings. Because the government is a
collaborator in the entity, it has the ability to guide its existence
248. See Aaron X. Fellmeth, Conception and Misconception in Joint
Inventorship, 2 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 73, 77 (2012) (“Collaborations
frequently involve teams from industry and universities or government agencies
joining forces to advance technology despite divergent economic interests.”);
Nancy J. Knauer, Learning Communities: A New Model for Legal Education, 7
ELON L. REV. 193, 212 (2015) (“The collaborative co-production of knowledge
requires divergent thought and is based on the combined efforts of a diverse range
of participants.”); Gerald P. López, Transform—Don’t Just Tinker with—Legal
Education (Part II), 24 CLINICAL L. REV. 247, 312 (2018) (“[W]e perhaps learn most
when we collaborate with others who see the world differently, [and] go about
their practices in ways different and even divergent from our own . . . .”).
249. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (discussing Otto von Gierke’s
work on group identity).
250. See supra Part IV.B (discussing Otto von Gierke’s role in the rise and
dominance of the real entity theory of the corporation during the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries).
251. See generally MORTEN T. HANSEN, COLLABORATION: HOW LEADERS AVOID
THE TRAPS, BUILD COMMON GROUND, AND REAP BIG RESULTS (2009); EVAN ROSEN,
THE CULTURE OF COLLABORATION: MAXIMIZING TIME, TALENT AND TOOLS TO CREATE
VALUE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2009); KEITH SAWYER, GROUP GENIUS: THE
CREATIVE POWER OF COLLABORATION (2007); LEIGH THOMPSON, CREATIVE
CONSPIRACY: THE NEW RULES OF BREAKTHROUGH COLLABORATION (2013).
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through law and regulation.252 In a myriad of different areas,
collaboration theory has normative implications. A complete
discussion of all these areas is beyond the scope of this Article, but
a significant amount can and will be said about collaboration
theory’s application to tax avoidance.
VI. Collaboration Theory and Tax Avoidance
One of the major problems with the prevailing theories of the
corporation is that their normative implications are very limited.253
The artificial entity theory, real entity theory, and aggregate
theory each have some descriptive appeal, but they fail to fully
describe the corporation.254 As a consequence, in attempting to
resolve fundamental issues regarding the corporation, each of
these theories often provides little or no guidance. With tax
avoidance, for example, one might argue that the artificial entity
theory suggests corporate managers should not engage in tax
avoidance because of the close relationship with the state, but such
an argument would be attenuated at best.255 The real entity theory
and aggregate theory seem to be no help in answering questions
relating to tax avoidance at all.256
Collaboration theory does a much better job providing
guidance as to whether corporate managers should engage in tax
avoidance activities. As will be explored in the remainder of this
Part, two viable models for addressing tax avoidance issues can be
derived from collaboration theory.257 However, between these two
models, this Article argues that collaboration theory should be

252. See supra note 245 and accompanying text (describing collaboration as a
“common effort” which suggests that all parties have a role to play in shaping that
collaboration).
253. See supra Parts IV.A–C (providing an overview of the prevailing
essentialist theories of the corporation).
254. See supra notes 237–247 and accompanying text (noting the deficiencies
of the prevailing essentialist theories of the corporation).
255. See supra Part IV.A (explaining the artificial entity theory of the
corporation).
256. See supra Part IV.B (explaining the real entity theory of the corporation).
257. See infra Part VI.A (giving an overview of the good faith model); infra
Part VI.B (giving an overview of the profit seeking model).
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understood to preclude corporate managers from engaging in
aggressive tax avoidance and perhaps any tax avoidance at all.258
A. The Good Faith Model
As previously explained, collaboration theory posits that the
corporation is a collaboration among the government and the
individuals organizing, operating, and owning the entity.259
Although the collaboration makes the corporation much more
substantial and robust than most contractual relationships, the
relationship among the government and the individuals
organizing, operating, and owning the firm is contractual in
nature.260 Importantly, under the aggregate theory, which has
been refined into the nexus of contracts theory, the focus is on the
contractual relationship among the individuals organizing,
owning, and operating the firm.261 Collaboration theory is different
because it shifts and expands the focus to include the
government.262
The contractual underpinnings of collaboration theory offer
one model for corporate managers deciding whether to engage in
tax avoidance, which I will term the “good faith model.” Implicit
within every contractual relationship is a duty of good faith that
requires parties to treat each other well within the scope of their
agreement.263
258. See infra Part V.C (arguing that the good faith model should always be
chosen over the profit seeking model in instances related to tax avoidance).
259. See supra Part V (explaining collaboration theory).
260. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (explaining the contractual
nature of the corporate form).
261. See supra Part IV.C (explaining the aggregate theory of the corporation).
262. See supra Part V (providing an overview of collaboration theory).
263. See U.C.C. § 1-304 (AM. LAW. INST. 2004) (“Every contract or duty within
[the Uniform Commercial Code] imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance and enforcement.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205
(AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good
faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”); Matthew T.
Bodie, The Best Way Out Is Always Through: Changing the Employment At-Will
Default Rule to Protect Personal Autonomy, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 223, 232
(“Common-law contract doctrine presumes that each contract has an implied duty
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Similarly and relatedly, within business forms, collaborators
have an obligation to treat each other with a duty of good faith
within the scope of their relationship. As Benjamin Cardozo
described it in Meinhard v. Salmon,264 while he was serving as
Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals at the time of the
opinion: “Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another,
while the enterprise continues, the duty of the finest
loyalty. . . . Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there
has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate.”265
Under collaboration theory, the parties composing the firm are
bound by duties of good faith that emanate from the contractual
relationship of the parties and from the business form itself.
As a result, corporate managers should not deprive the
government of the tax revenue that it hoped to generate through
the creation of the corporation. As previously discussed, under
collaboration theory, the collaboration is defined as a common
effort between or among multiple entities to accomplish a task or
a project.266 In regard to for-profit corporations, the common
project is economic development and economic gain for the parties
involved.267 When corporate managers engage in tax avoidance,
they violate the duty of good faith by treating the government
abusively, and they frustrate at least one of the government’s
purposes for entering the contract, i.e., to procure funds via
taxation for purposes of maintaining and improving the state.268
B. The Profit Seeking Model

of good faith and fair dealing.”); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Privacy, the Hacker Way,
87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 54 (2013) (“Courts have recognized that every contract
imposes the duty of good faith and fair dealing to protect the parties’ reasonable
expectations. This approach serves to legally solidify the idea that rules of
exchange should reflect reasonable business conduct.”).
264. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
265. Id. at 546.
266. See supra Part V (explaining collaboration theory).
267. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of a
for-profit corporation, which is to make a profit).
268. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing that tax avoidance
is one potential way to improve a corporation’s financial performance).
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Tension certainly exists between the implied duties of good
faith within the firm and the deal that the government has struck
with the individuals organizing, operating, and owning the
corporation.269 The state and the individuals organizing, operating,
and owning the corporation have expressly agreed to create a
for-profit corporation, which must seek profit.270 Because lowering
a corporation’s tax burden is one of the ways of improving the
financial performance of the firm,271 a second potential model
emerges under collaboration theory as to how corporate managers
should make decisions regarding whether to engage in tax
avoidance.
Under this model, the analysis hinges on whether a cost
benefit analysis demonstrates that the tax avoidance strategy is
beneficial to the corporation. This model, which I will term the
“profit seeking model,” involves four scenarios. In the first
scenario, the costs of the tax avoidance activity outweigh its
benefits. At first blush, this might seem impossible because tax
avoidance has been defined as structuring business transactions to
reduce a firm’s tax obligations in a manner that technically
complies with the law, but violates the spirit or underlying policies
of the law.272 Because tax avoidance is by definition legal, one
might believe that its benefits would always outweigh its costs.
However, tax avoidance has a variety of potential costs associated
with it. These include increased government scrutiny of the
corporation’s operations273 and public scorn of the corporation for
not shouldering its tax burden.274 In addition, some tax avoidance
schemes may simply be too expensive for certain corporations to
269. See supra note 263 and accompanying text (discussing the implied
fiduciary duties of good faith within the corporation).
270. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (explaining that for-profit
corporations exist to make a profit).
271. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (explaining one of the benefits
associated with tax avoidance).
272. See supra Part II.A (defining tax avoidance).
273. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (explaining that one result of
corporate tax avoidance is increased scrutiny of corporate operations).
274. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (explaining that the public has
become increasingly critical of corporations failing to pay their fair share of taxes
through the use of tax avoidance).

COLLABORATION THEORY

155

undertake.275 For example, a small corporation in Nebraska is
unlikely to go through the time and expense of setting up foreign
subsidiaries to obtain a favorable tax rate on a portion of its
income. Under the profit seeking model, based upon the profit
seeking nature of the corporation, corporate managers should
refrain from engaging in the tax avoidance strategy when its costs
exceed its benefits.
In the second scenario, the tax avoidance activity is cost
neutral. In this scenario the cost of setting up the tax avoidance
scheme or the negative repercussions of the tax avoidance scheme
are equal to any benefit that could be reaped. Under the profit
seeking model of the corporation, the agreement that the
individuals organizing, operating, and owning the corporation is
that they will seek a profit.276 What is confounding about scenario
two is that any cost or benefit cancel each other out. At this point
in the profit seeking model, the fiduciary duties discussed in the
previous section would come into play to tip the scales in favor of
not undertaking the tax avoidance activity because the express
agreement to seek profits within the corporation would provide no
guidance, and as a consequence, the state should be allowed to
obtain the tax revenue.277
In the third scenario, the cost benefit analysis is uncertain,
and the tax avoidance activity may lead to an economic benefit, or
it may lead to a loss. Although debatable, the tax avoidance
activity once again should not be undertaken. When the cost
benefit analysis is uncertain, the duties of good faith that emanate
from contractual nature of the collaboration and the business form
itself should be enough to require corporate managers not to
engage in the tax avoidance activity. The government has allowed
275. See Alexia Fernandez Campbell, The Cost of Corporate Tax Avoidance,
ATLANTIC
(Apr.
14,
2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/04/corporate-taxavoidance/478293/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2019) (reporting on how large
corporations avoid taxes through offshore accounts and shell companies, while
smaller corporations end up paying the full tax rate) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
276. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (explaining that a for-profit
corporation is designed to seek profit).
277. See supra Part VI.A (discussing the duties of good faith at play within
collaboration theory based upon the contractual nature of the corporation and
emanating from the business form).
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for the creation of the corporation in part as a means of generating
tax revenue, and when in doubt, corporate managers, rather than
engaging in tax avoidance, ought to err on the side of allowing the
government to collect revenue.
Finally, in the fourth scenario, the cost benefit analysis
suggests a clear financial benefit to the firm through undertaking
the tax avoidance activity. Under the profit seeking model, one
would have to argue that because the corporation exists to make a
profit, that the tax avoidance activity must be undertaken.278
However, as will be explained in the next section, this view of the
collaboration between the government and individuals organizing,
operating, and owning the corporation is too simplistic.
C. Choosing the Good Faith Model
At first blush, collaboration theory seems problematic because
it seems to suggest that both the good faith model and profit
seeking model are appropriate for corporate managers to use in
determining whether to engage in tax avoidance. In some
instances, this does not matter. When the costs of tax avoidance
outweigh the benefits, when the tax avoidance strategy is cost
neutral, and when the cost benefit analysis is uncertain, both
models suggest that tax avoidance activities should not be
undertaken.279 The problem arises in regard to tax avoidance
activities with a clear financial benefit because the profit seeking
model suggests that they should be undertaken, and the good faith
model suggests the reverse.280
Resolving this problem turns on the deal that the individuals
organizing, operating, and owning the corporation struck with the
state in collaborating to form the corporation. In general, that deal
is to seek profit because the common project, which is the basis of

278. See supra Part II.B (discussing the potential benefits of tax avoidance,
including improving the financial performance of the corporation).
279. See supra Part VI.A–B (describing the good faith model and the profit
seeking model).
280. See supra Part VI.A–B.
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the collaboration, is economic development and economic gain.281
The individuals organizing, operating, and owning the corporation
are seeking their own economic development and economic gain,
and the government is seeking societal economic development and
economic gain. As a result, the corporate managers are required to
seek profit. Elsewhere, I have argued that the profit seeking model
requires corporate managers to decline to engage in socially
responsible acts, if the financial benefit to the corporation is
clear.282 If the government is unhappy about the acts, then it has
the ability to pass positive law to alter the cost-benefit analysis.283
Therefore, in general, the profit seeking model should be preferred
over the good faith model.
However, in regard to tax avoidance, the good faith model
should be preferred to the profit seeking model. This means that
tax avoidance is to be avoided in all circumstances. This includes
circumstances in which a clear financial benefit exists from the tax
avoidance activity, i.e., circumstances involving tax avoidance
activities that the profit seeking model would require corporate
managers to pursue. In short, tax is different. The reason for this
is the deal that is struck between the government and the
individuals organizing, operating, and owning the corporation. A
for-profit corporation unsurprisingly exists to make a profit,284 and
under collaboration theory, the government and the individuals
organizing, operating, and owning the corporation have created
the entity for purposes of economic development and economic
gain. When corporate managers engage in tax avoidance, they
frustrate one of the government’s main reasons for collaborating
within the corporate form (i.e. to procure funds via taxation for
purposes of maintaining and improving the state).285 Therefore,
281. See supra note 122 (explaining that the reason for the existence of
for-profit corporations is to make a profit).
282. See Chaffee, Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 38, at 377
(exploring the application of collaboration theory to corporate social
responsibility).
283. See id. (“Through regulation, regulators can change the cost-benefit
analysis that leads corporations to engage in socially reprehensible
behavior . . . .”).
284. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of a
for-profit corporation).
285. See supra Part V (providing an overview of collaboration theory,
including the government’s reasons for engaging in the collaboration).
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this Article takes the position that in regard to tax avoidance
issues, the good faith model is the correct model to use because it
correctly reflects the deal that the individuals organizing,
operating, and owning the corporation struck with the
government.
D. Lingering Concerns About the Good Faith Model
Although the good faith model is the appropriate method of
applying collaboration theory to tax avoidance decision-making, a
few lingering concerns can be raised, including why the
corporation should limit tax avoidance in regard to the federal
government, when the state government allows for its
incorporation; why tax minimization is permissible, while tax
avoidance is not; and how to limit or eliminate tax avoidance, when
it has a relatively vague definition. Each of these concerns will be
addressed in turn.
The good faith model of applying collaboration theory to
corporate tax avoidance creates questions as to why the
corporation should refrain from tax avoidance in regard to the
federal system of taxation because the collaboration is among the
state government and the individuals organizing, operating, and
owning the corporation. In terms of the corporation’s state tax
burden, the good faith model speaks directly as to why the
corporation should not engage in tax avoidance.286 This is because
incorporation occurs at the state level in the United States.287 The
286. See supra Part VI.A (explaining the good faith model).
287. See M. Thomas Arnold, “It's Déjà Vu All Over Again”: Using Bounty
Hunters to Leverage Gatekeeper Duties, 45 TULSA L. REV. 419, 424 (2010)
(“Corporation law historically has been a matter of state law. Most corporations
are formed under state law and are, for the most part, governed by state law.”);
Justin Blount, Creating A Stakeholder Democracy Under Existing Corporate Law,
18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 365, 381 (2016) (“In the United States, corporations are
creatures of statute, created almost exclusively at the state level, with Delaware
being the most popular state of incorporation.”); Elizabeth Kingsley & John
Pomeranz, A Crash at the Crossroads: Tax and Campaign Finance Laws Collide
in Regulation of Political Activities of Tax-Exempt Organizations, 31 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 55, 60 (2004) (“Nonprofit corporations or associations, like their
for-profit counterparts, are creatures of state law.”).
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issue then becomes why the corporation should not engage in
aggressive tax avoidance in regard to its federal taxes as a means
of improving the firm’s financial performance because the federal
government is not a direct party to the collaboration. The
obligation not to engage in tax avoidance on the federal level is
derivative of the duty to the state government. The state
government entered the collaboration with the individuals
organizing, operating, and owning the corporation for purposes of
economic development and economic gain.288 A strong federal
system helps to enable these pursuits through, for example,
maintaining a strong national economy and maintaining a strong
system of national defense.289 Notably, the need for a strong
national government to help to protect and enhance the states was
one of the animating reasons for the transition from the Articles of
Confederation to the Constitution, which provides the federal
government with the power to tax.290 As a result, the obligation not
288. See supra Part V (providing an overview of collaboration theory).
289. See Swati Agrawal, Trusts Betrayed: The Absent Federal Partner in
Immigration Policy, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 755, 793 (1996) (“Division of power
between the state and federal governments fosters efficiency of governance.
Efficient distribution of power means that the federal government
is . . . responsible for harmonizing and unifying policy regarding foreign and
interstate relations . . . .”); Kevin Hopkins, The Politics of Misconduct: Rethinking
How We Regulate Lawyer-Politicians, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 839, 885 (2005) (“The
Framers of the Constitution’s selection of a federalist form of government was a
compromise that was designed both to insure the existence of a strong central
government, which was lacking under the Articles of Confederation, and to
accommodate and protect the interests of the existing state governments.”); David
M. Schizer, Fiscal Policy in an Era of Austerity, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 453,
485 (2012) (“[S]tates do not have the same responsibilities [as the federal
government] (for example, for national defense), and usually can depend on help
from the federal government in an emergency.”).
290. See Eric Engle, Is Bitcoin Rat Poison? Cryptocurrency, Crime, and
Counterfeiting (CCC), 16 J. HIGH TECH. L. 340, 358 (2016) (“An essential failing of
the articles of confederation of the United States, the constitutional precursor to
the current United States constitution, was finance: the articles of confederation
provided no independent taxation power to the confederal government . . . .”);
John T. Plecnik, The New Flat Tax: A Modest Proposal for a Constitutionally
Apportioned Wealth Tax, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 483, 506 (2013) (“It is
uncontroverted that the principal reason for adopting the Constitution in lieu of
the old Articles of Confederation was to enhance the taxing power of the federal
government.”); Steven J. Willis & Hans G. Tanzler IV, Affordable Care Act Fails
for Lack of Uniformity, 27 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 81, 86 (2016) (“The
Constitution is substantially about the taxing power: the Articles of
Confederation failed, at least in part, because Congress had no power to tax.”).
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to engage in federal tax avoidance is in fact derivable from the
duties owed to the state under collaboration theory. One would
have a hard time arguing that the states would be able to engage
in effective economic development if the federal government is
starved of funds through corporate tax avoidance.291
A second concern regarding the application of collaboration
theory to tax avoidance using the good faith model is that it creates
questions as to why tax minimization is permissible, while tax
avoidance is not. If depriving the government of revenue as a result
of tax avoidance strategies is not permissible, depriving the
government of revenue as a result of tax minimization strategies
appears to be troubling as well because tax minimization also
deprives the government of revenue.292 The difference, however, is
that tax minimization is both legally permissible and acceptable
by the government.293 As explained earlier, for purposes of this
Article, tax minimization occurs when a taxpayer reflectively
makes tax compliance decisions with the goal of reducing that
taxpayer’s tax burden within the intended scope of the law.294 In
contrast, tax avoidance means the structuring of business
transactions to reduce a firm’s tax obligations in a manner that
technically complies with the law but violates the spirit of the
law.295 Under collaboration theory, tax minimization is
permissible, while tax avoidance is not, based on the deal that has
been struck between the government and the individuals
organizing, operating, and owning the corporation.296 In terms of
291. See ROBERT JAY DILGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40638, FEDERAL
GRANTS TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 1 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40638.pdf (“In
[Fiscal Year] 2018, the federal government is expected to provide state and local
governments about $728 billion in federal grants encompassing a wide range of
public policy areas . . . .”).
292. See supra Part II.A (discussing tax minimization as a means of lowering
a corporation’s tax burden).
293. See supra Part II.A (exploring the spectrum of tax compliance behavior,
which includes tax avoidance).
294. See supra Part II.A (providing a definition of tax minimization).
295. See supra Part II.A (providing a definition of tax avoidance).
296. See supra Part VI.A (describing the contractual underpinnings of
collaboration theory and the good faith obligation tied to those underpinnings).
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the deal struck, the idea is that to reap the benefits of the
collaboration, the individuals organizing, operating, and owning
the corporation will comply with the law.297 In regard to tax
minimization, as defined in this Article, the individuals
organizing, operating, and owning the corporation are in full
compliance with the letter and spirit of the law.298 In regard to tax
avoidance, those individuals are not.299 Although those individuals
are violating only the spirit of the law through tax avoidance, one
would have a difficult time arguing that the deal struck with the
government was that those individuals could be abusive to the
laws and regulations of the government.
A third and final complaint that could be lodged against the
good faith model and collaboration theory in general as applied to
tax avoidance is that it does not provide a bright-line standard for
purposes of helping corporate managers make tax compliance
decisions. The spectrum of tax compliance behavior discussed
above does not provide crisp, clean categories of tax compliance
behavior because these categories blend and blur into each
other.300 As a consequence, in the business world, one may have
difficulty distinguishing tax avoidance from tax minimization or
tax avoidance from tax evasion.301 Although a bright-line standard
would be nice, legal mandates upon the business world are often
not crisp and clear. For example, the fiduciary duties discussed
above have filled reporters with cases in which courts struggle with

297. See supra Part VI.A (noting that, since the government is an essential
part of the overall collaboration, corporations should not deprive the government
of expected tax revenue).
298. See supra Part II.A (defining the term “tax minimization” and providing
examples of this behavior).
299. See supraPart II.A (defining the term “tax avoidance” and comparing this
behavior to other behaviors within the spectrum of tax compliance).
300. See supra Part II.A (defining tax avoidance through a discussion of the
spectrum of tax compliance behavior).
301. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Legitimacy and the Right of Revolution: The
Role of Tax Protests and Anti-Tax Rhetoric in America, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 819, 874
n.153 (2002) (“The difference between tax avoidance and tax evasion is that the
latter is illegal, while the former is just smart tax planning. The boundary
between the two is blurry.”); Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms
and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1454 n.1 (2003)
(“[T]he line between illegal tax evasion and legal tax avoidance is sometimes
blurry.”).
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their contours and implementation.302 Although collaboration
theory may not provide perfect guidance in regard to what to do in
making tax strategy decisions, applying the theory in this context
still demonstrates that a legal mandate exists not to engage in tax
avoidance, and it provides more guidance than simply ignoring the
true nature of the firm.
VII. Conclusion
As a result of recent tax reform, the permissibility of tax
avoidance is a hot legal issue. The essential nature of the corporate
form offers an excellent place to begin in understanding when and
to what extent engaging in tax avoidance is mandated. This
approach has not been taken before in the existing literature. By
understanding the corporation as a collaboration between the
government and the individuals organizing, operating, and owning
the corporation, the impermissibility of aggressive corporate tax
avoidance becomes apparent. Collaborators in business ventures
owe each other a duty of good faith, and the contractual nature of
the corporation carries with it a duty of a good faith as well. As a
result, the notion becomes fanciful that depriving the government
of revenue through aggressive corporate tax avoidance strategies
is required or even permissible. Tax avoidance is by definition
violating the spirit of the law, and it is an affront to the
collaboration that forms the foundation of the corporate form
because it frustrates one of the government’s purposes for entering
the collaboration (i.e. gaining revenue).

302. See supra Part III.B (discussing the fiduciary duties corporate managers
owe to the corporation and its stockholders).

